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An Ever Distant Union: The Cross-Border Loss Relief
Conundrum in EU Law
Violeta Ruiz Almendral
Cross-border loss relief may well be the last milestone, barring total tax consolidation, in the European Union (EU) market integration from a tax law
perspective. As the Commission’s Communication on the Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations demonstrates, there is yet a lot of ground to be
covered in harmonizing this aspect of corporate income taxes (CITs). While the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) proposal seems to
be stalled, a series of relatively recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) cases (among others, X Holding BV) may be tilting the balance in the interest of
Member States, for the first time allowing the safeguard of revenues, or the ‘balanced allocation of taxing powers’ to be the deciding argument in allowing
restrictions on the offsetting of losses. Losses cannot be analysed in isolation of the rules to determine the taxable base, as they are one more piece in the tax
base puzzle. In this article, I focus on two issues: multinational groups and permanent establishments (PEs), as they comprise the main problems arising
in cross-border loss relief. The different methods employed to grant loss relief are assessed, as well as the new Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) proposals on the taxation of PEs. My main argument is that restrictions of loss relief have an effect that go beyond discriminating
or restricting – that is, beyond making it ‘less attractive’ to move around the EU. Such restrictions touch the core of taxation of income. If no loss relief is
provided, the tax is not reflecting the real ability to pay, thus not only is it not being neutral and inefficient, it is also creating a fictional tax debt.
1. INTRODUCTION
Cross-border loss relief is one of the most significant bur-
dens hindering European Union (EU) market integration in
direct taxation.1 The type of problems that the lack of cross-
border loss relief in many transnational (EU-wide) opera-
tions brings about exemplifies the tensions that an imper-
fect economic integration model of the EU has on the
definition of the tax base of income taxes and, namely, the
notions of allocation of taxing powers and territoriality of
taxes.
This was the situation that encouraged the proposal of a
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), the
objectives being to remove the current obstacles to compa-
nies that undertake EU-wide activities.2 Among the main
obstacles mentioned in the proposal are the compliance
costs, transfer pricing requirements, non-consolidation of
profits and losses, difficult restructuring operations as the
Merger Directive has a limited scope, the credit versus
exemption method inconsistencies, and the many discrimi-
natory situations that still arise.
The 2006 Commission’s Communication on the Tax
Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations demonstrates that
there is yet a lot of ground to be covered in harmonizing this
aspect of (corporation and individual) income taxes.3 While
the CCCTB proposal seems to be stalled, a series of relevant
European Court of Justice (ECJ) cases (among others,
Marks & Spencer, Lidl Belgium, OyAA, Amurta, Krankenheim
Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt GmbH, Mertens, and,
most recently, X Holding BV) may be tilting the balance in
the interest of Member States, for the first time allowing the
safeguard of revenues, or the ‘balanced allocation of taxing
powers’ to be the sole or main deciding argument in allow-
ing restrictions on the offsetting of losses.
In this article, I will focus on the transfer of losses
in companies (multinational groups and permanent
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establishments (PEs)), leaving out individuals, as the former
comprise the main problems vis-a`-vis the internal market.
My main argument is that restrictions of loss relief have an
effect that go beyond discriminating or restricting – that is,
beyond making it ‘less attractive’ for businesses to
move around the EU. Such restrictions touch the core of
taxation of income. If no loss relief is provided, the tax will
then not be reflecting the real ability to pay. This means
that taxation of companies in a transnational setting will
not be neutral and will also be inefficient, as it will be
creating a fictional tax debt. A second argument that will
be presented in the following pages is that the Court’s
action is not only limited when facing the essential pro-
blems that cross-border loss relief systems pose, but it may
also be inadvertently creating new problems as Member
States adapt their tax legislation to comply with the ECJ
case law in a way that is not always optimal vis-a`-vis
the notion of neutrality, thus dwarfing the very purpose of
the Court.
The underlying problem is of course larger than just
coordinating tax losses. As I will try to demonstrate in the
following pages, the seemingly incoherence of loss relief
systems in the EU and the different attempts to soften them,
by the Commission, by the Court, and also by projects such
as the CCCTB, are a good example of the difficulties in tax
harmonization in the EU in a globalized environment.4 It
may seem that the Court is growingly taking into account
the revenue interests of the Member States, but this may
only hold true if we take into account the short-term interest
in revenue enhancing. For if we pause down and consider
the mid- and long-term best interests of Member States, we
may conclude that it could be worth renouncing to
(immediate) tax revenues in the short run, in order to
maintain tax revenues in the mid and long terms. For in
the long run, without a sound and coherent system of CITs
in the EU, the possibilities of competing and of maintaining
tax revenues are slim.
2. LOSS RELIEF AS THE CORNERSTONE
OF DETERMINING A BUSINESS ENTITY
TAXABLE BASE
2.1. The Problem of Taxing Losses in
Income Taxes
Income taxes bestow an asymmetric treatment to income
and losses, so that while the first is taxed as it is earned,
losses will only generate a tax credit and eventual refund
when they can be offset against the future income
(in some cases, also past income, as is the case with loss
carry-back systems). By definition, any carry-forward
system entails a further hidden loss in that losses are of
course carried with no interest, which eventually
minimizes the tax benefit of interest deductions. Finally,
any given system of offsetting of losses is complicated
because of the artificial adaptation of income taxes to a
given (annual) time frame. Adding the cross-border
element substantially contributes to this fractioning:
the loss must then not only be timely offset, but it must
also fit into territorial boundaries. Time and space thus
define and constraint the offsetting of losses in a myriad
of different combinations. We will now offer what can
only be a simplified account of such possibilities.
The system and the problems of taking into account
losses are intimately linked with income taxes being period-
ical taxes. In the case of Wealth taxes, which accrue and are
assessed on an instant basis, there will be several issues to be
considered when deciding what items qualify as a loss and
how this must be quantified. Those issues are also present in
income taxes but are intertwined with a more fundamental
time frame issue. The typical structure of a Personal or
Corporate Income Tax (PIT or CIT) entails taxing the net
revenue accrued on an annual basis. Should there be no
revenue, but only losses, tax will not ensue, and there may
be an option to offset the loss in the future (or against past
benefits, in some cases).5
In the absence of a provision that allows a carry
forward (or even backwards) of the possible losses,
over-taxation will ensue. An agent accruing a net ben-
efit of 1,000 on year n but who has been incurring
annual losses of 500 in years n – 1 and n – 2 has not really
earned 1,000, but 0. Because Governments do not share
the economic risk of the taxpayers, all tax systems are
naturally asymmetric when taxing income, in the sense
that benefits are taxed but losses are not, which in our
example means that the agent will not have obtained any
tax back in the losing years, but will be subject to tax (if
not actually taxed, as an obligation to pay will not ensue)
on the winning year.
Losses are an essential part of defining the taxable base
and are the consequence of periodical (annual) taxes; the
taxation of income on a yearly basis is done for obvious
economic reasons (to obtain tax revenues on a yearly basis),
but it is artificial or exogenous to economic cycles of entities
or persons. In addition, if applied too strictly, it ends up
showing an incomplete picture of the entity.
This is why taking into account losses for tax purposes is
not really a tax benefit, but rather the only way to tax an
entity in accordance to its real ability to pay.6 In the end,
4 See W. Scho¨n, ‘International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best World (Part 1)’, World Tax Journal, IFA Congress Issue (September 2009): 67 et seq.
5 The issue of time and income taxes has long been the object of discussions and constitutes a fascinating debate; should income taxes be annual or economic cycle sensitive? Should
they be taxing persons following an age curve? See more on this in L.A. Fenner & K.J. Stark, ‘Taxation over Time’, Tax Law Review 59 (2005–2006).
6 E. Sanz Gadea, ‘Compensacion de Bases Imponibles Negativas’, Estudios Financieros 192 (1999): 11.
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defining a loss is part of defining the tax base, and as such
relates to a more fundamental issue that is the definition of
profit.7 For this reason, any system that allows for the
offsetting of losses is not establishing a tax advantage, as the
ECJ has wrongly suggested in some occasions (Marks &
Spencer, paragraph 38, Lidl Belgium, paragraph 23), but taxing
income on a periodical basis in accordance, or rather follow-
ing as closely as possible, the entity’s real ability to pay or
income.
This has exceptions, as some loss transfer relief schemes
may be deemed to be tax benefits, because of their nature.
That may be the case of group taxation loss compensation,
which can thus be considered to be tax advantage.8
It naturally follows that losses cannot be analysed in
isolation of the rules that serve to determine the taxable
base, as they are one more piece, but an essential one too,
in the tax base puzzle. Profits and losses are two sides of
the same coin and the real discussion is only how to
assess the taxable income. However, because losses may
for the purpose of assessing the tax be isolated, and
because different systems of integrating or compensating
them coexist, it is worth examining them with a certain,
if ever artificial, independence from the rest of the ele-
ments of the tax base.
2.2. The Need to Offset Losses and the
Principles of Taxation: Ability to Pay
and Territoriality
It has been argued that the worldwide taxation principle
that, following the ability-to-pay principle shapes CITs
and PITs, makes a strong case for the need to offset
extraterritorial losses is the only way to fully assess the
income of the tax person.9 This would also mean, if the
argument is coherently followed, that income taxes are not
essentially territorial as long as the basis on which they
were established was the ability-to-pay principle. It then
follows that:
in a traditional income tax setting, any distinction
between domestic and foreign source income and losses
must be regarded as a contradiction to the basic assump-
tion of the income tax as such, as an artificial distinction
which is not part of the general framework which has to
be shaped by the Member State alone.10
The argument is certainly attractive and coherent, from
a strictly logical point of view, with ability to pay being
the widely accepted underlining rational of income taxes.
There are, however, two problems with it. On the one
hand, worldwide taxation cannot miss the territorial link;
on the other, ability to pay is the basis (and a logic
element) for taxation but not the only principle shaping
taxes.
It could even be questionable whether Member States
actually do have income taxes largely based on the ability-
to-pay principle11 or whether it can be sustained that
income taxes are purely based on this principle, especially
taking into account that tax laws also purport to fulfil other
objectives, such as establishing incentives and disincentives
to invest in certain areas, which are only loosely based on
ability to pay. A good example of this is the home-
ownership tax incentives, which clearly do not always ben-
efit the worst-off.12
True, the ability-to-pay principle has a central relevance.
While not an EU Law principle, there are grounds to
maintain that to the extent that it is a principle common
to most EU members, it does have relevance in EU Law, as it
does in International Tax Law.13 However, the ability-to-
pay principle is not the only fundamental element of direct
taxation or even currently the most important, even in
countries, such as Germany or Spain, that follow a long
7 See recently J. Freedman & G. Macdonald, ‘The Tax Base for CCCTB: The Role of Principles’, in Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, ed. M. Lang, P. Pistone, J. Schuch & C.
Staringer (Linde: Wien, 2008), 234–236. A. Auerbach, M.P. Devereux & H. Simpson, ‘Taxing Corporate Income’, in Dimensions of Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review, ed. J. Mirrlees,
et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, April 2010), 898, ISBN: 978-0-19-955375-4, <www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesReview>. See also Cordero E.M. Gonza´lez, ‘Apuntes sobre el
tratamiento de las bases imponibles negativas en los impuestos sobre la renta’, Estudios Financieros. Revista de contabilidad y tributacio´n 285 (2006): 15 et seq. See also E.M. Cordero
Gonzalez, ‘La compensacio´n de bases imponibles negativas en el impuesto sobre sociedades’, in La crisis econo´mica y su incidencia en el sistema tributario AA.VV. (Aranzadi, 2009).
E. Sanz Gadea, ‘La compensacio´n de pe´rdidas de filiales extranjeras: Marks & Spencer’, Estudios Financieros 276 (2006). E. Sanz Gadea, ‘Impuesto sobre Sociedades y Reforma
Contable (II)’, Estudios Financieros 317–318 (2009).
8 See CFE, ‘Opinion Statement of the CFE ECJ Taskforce on Losses Compensation within the EU for Individuals and Companies Carrying Out Their Activities through Permanent
Establishments, Paper Submitted by the Confe´de´ration Fiscale Europe´enne to the European Institutions in July 2009’, European Taxation (October 2009): 489 et seq.
9 W. Scho¨n, ‘Losing Out at the Snooker Table: Cross-Border Loss Compensation for PEs and the Fundamental Freedoms’, in A Vision of Taxes within and outside European Borders,
ed. L. Hinnekens & P. Hinnekens (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2008), 818. See, by the same author, ‘Besteuerung im Binnenmarkt’, Internationales Steuerrecht
(2004): 294.
10 Scho¨n, supra n. 9, 818.
11 On the crisis of the ‘ability to pay principle’ in tax law, see recently C. Palao Taboada, Leistungsfa¨higkeitsprinzip, Gleichheitssatz und Eigentumsgarantie Festschrift fu¨r Joachim Lang
(Ko¨ln: Verlag Otto Schmidt, 2010, forthcoming).
12 See R. Wernsmann, Verhaltenslenkung in einem rationalen Steuersystem (Tu¨bingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 245 et seq.
13 See, in this regard, the two following works: J.C. Fleming, R.J. Peroni & S.E. Shay, ‘Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income’,
Florida Tax Review 4, no. 4 (2001): 299–354. M. Graetz, ‘Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts and Unsatisfactory Policies’, Tax Law Review
54 (2001).
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tradition of granting central relevance to this principle
among the definition of tax justice.14
Granting a central relevance to a principle such as the
ability to pay can also be problematic. To begin with,
because it is, by definition, a relative principle and it is
simply not possible to derive conclusions from it without
bearing in mind public expenditures.15 This connection
might at first glance seem far fetched, but it is easy to
understand if we connect the ability-to-pay principle with
the right to property or, largely, ownership. In the end, it is
a philosophical question, but (and) a really fundamental
one: property rights are perceived as moral entitlements
but are in essence the result of a law and institutional
system, which is financed by a tax system.16 In the end,
Governments participate, via taxation, in the economic
success of their citizens, a success for which they are partly
responsible.17
This also means that the tax system represents a
central role in defining public and private poverties
and in defining the distribution of benefits on a large
scale, be it ownership (of assets, income, and so on) and
in the form of benefits provided by the Government.18
This is of course not contradictory with the recognition of
property rights in the Hegelian sense of enabling human
dignity,19 but following Kirchhof, taxes are the precondi-
tion, and not the mere consequence, of the guarantee of
property rights.20
Furthermore, the ability-to-pay principle is just one side
or aspect of tax justice and an obligation (the actual
payment of the tax) that happens afterwards, that is, once
we assume that, as a fundamental prerequisite for existing,
the States must participate in the economic success of their
citizens (residents) by way of taxing them in order to finance
public expenditures. This participation – taxation – means a
distribution of costs among citizens, and the main principle
to shape this distribution of costs is the principle of
equality.21 Often enough, equality will demand unequal
treatment of two situations theoretically showing the same
ability to pay, as happens when some transactions – easier or
cheaper to evaluate or control – are more heavily taxed than
others (see labour taxes versus the taxation of financial opera-
tions).22 In these cases, the departing point to analyse the
tax from a tax justice perspective (in some countries, from a
Constitutional perspective) will be the principle of equality,
not the notion of ability to pay alone.
The ability-to-pay principle is then one of the possible
consequences of the principle of equality.23 The principle
will imply two things: first, adapting the tax burden in
relation to the real capacity of payment of the tax person.24
This is largely a consequence of some basic economic logic,
which means the Government must look for an adequate
element indicating that there is an ability to pay tax and
maintain the activity.25 Second, the principle will often
entail establishing unequal measures to take into account
elements that entail a different level of need (i.e., chil-
dren tax allowances, taxpayer age allowances).26 Other ele-
ments may also be taken into account, which have no
connection whatsoever with a purely ability-to-pay notion.
For instance, green tax credits, that may even have a regres-
sive effect.
What does this mean for the territoriality principle? It
may well be that in its purest notion territoriality does run
counter to the ability to pay and worldwide taxation bino-
mial. However, territoriality, not ability to pay, is the basis
of taxation and therefore comes first, bearing in mind its
essential objective, which is to raise revenue in order to pay
for public duties, which are carried out by a territory-based
political entity such as the State. Ability to pay, in the legal
14 In this regard, see Palao Taboada, supra n. 11. C. Palao Taboada, ‘Apogeo y crisis del principio de capacidad contributiva’, in Estudios Jurı´dicos en homenaje al Profesor Federico de Castro
AA.VV., vol. II (Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Jurı´dicos-Tecnos, 1975), 422 et seq. ‘Los principios de capacidad econo´mica e igualdad en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal
Constitucional’, REDF 88 (1995): 629 et seq. V. Ruiz Almendral & J. Zornoza Pe´rez, ‘Constitucio´n econo´mica y Hacienda Pu´blica’, in La Constitucio´n a examen: un estudio acade´mico
25 an˜os despue´s, ed. G. Peces-Barba Martı´nez & M.A. Ramiro Avile´s (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2004), 650 et seq.; V. Ruiz Almendral, ‘Impuestos y Estado Social’, in Finanzas Pu´blicas
y Constitucio´n, ed. J.J. Zornoza Pe´rez (Quito: Corporacio´n Editora Nacional, 2004), 15 et seq. J.J. Zornoza Pe´rez, ‘Aspectos constitucionales del re´gimen de tributacio´n conjunta en
el IRPF’, REDC 27 (1989): 173. M.P. Alguacil Marı´, ‘La capacidad econo´mica como para´metro de enjuiciamiento’, Revista de Derecho Financiero y Hacienda Pu´blica (RDFyHP) 253
(1999): 581 et seq.; A. Rodrı´guez Bereijo, ‘El deber de contribuir como deber constitucional. Su significado jurı´dico’, REDF 125 (2005): 39 and 40. In Germany, see K. Vogel,
‘Die Besonderheit des Steuerrechts’, in Deustche Steuer-Zeitung, series A (1977), 9; D. Birk, Das Leistungsfa¨higkeitsprinzip als Maßtab der Steuernormen (Ko¨ln:Dr Peter Deubner Verlag
GMBH, 1983), 52 et seq.
15 L. Murphy & T. Nagel, The Myth of Ownership. Taxes and Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 9.
16 See recently Murphy & Nagel, supra n. 15, 8 et seq. and 174 et seq. See also the already classic work of R.W. Walz, Steuergerechtigkeit und Rechtsanwendung. Grundlinien einer relativ
autonomen Steuerrechtsdogmatik (Heidelberg: Decker, 1980), 31 and 37.
17 See German Constitutional Court case: BVerfG, BStBl. II 1995, 655 et seq. (para. C. II. 1. b, 660) on the Wealth tax (‘Vermo¨gensteuer’). In this regard, see D. Birk & R. Eckhoff,
‘Staatsfinanzierung durch Gebu¨hren und Steuern: Vor- und Nachteile aus juristischer Perspective’, in Vom Steuerstaat zum Gebu¨hrenstaat, ed. Ute. Sacksofsky & J. Wieland (Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000), 55.
18 Murphy & Nagel, supra n. 15, 76.
19 Hegel, The Philosophy of Right (1821), ss 41 and 53; see also Murphy & Nagel, supra n. 15, 45.
20 P. Kirchhof, ‘Verfassungsrechtliche und steuersystematische Grundlagen der Einkommensteuer’, in Besteuerung von Einkommen. Deutschen Steuerjuristischen Gesellschaft e. V.,
ed. I. Ebling, Band 24 (Ko¨ln: Verlag Dr Otto Schmidt, 2001), 13. Murphy & Nagel, supra n. 15, 70–73.
21 Birk, supra n. 14, 167; Alguacil Marı´, supra n. 14, 607 et seq., con mayores referencias. Rodrı´guez Bereijo, supra n. 14, 27 et seq.
22 Wernsmann, supra n. 12, 304 et seq.
23 Birk, supra n. 14, 155 et seq., 165 and 170; Wernsmann, supra n. 12, 286 et seq.
24 Rodrı´guez Bereijo, supra n. 14, 27 et seq.
25 Birk, supra n. 14, 166 et seq.
26 Ibid., 27.
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sense,27 comes afterwards, in order to design the tax, or the
tax system even.
According to Scho¨n, ‘if a Member State decides to set up
an income tax under the ‘‘ability-to-pay’’ principle, any
territorial distinctions are artificial and not an expression
of the fundamental tax autonomy of this state’.28 The only
way to support this view would be in the framework of EU
tax coordination, stressing the fact that, at the end of the
day, all EU taxpayers are supposed to pay for the cost of
belonging to the EU, from which they also benefit hugely.
It is of course true that territorial taxation does not make
sense in a political integrated (or integrated-to-be) Union
and runs counter to the notion of EU citizenship29 and,
more fundamentally, to the economic logic of sharing a
common (also mainly economic) destiny. A look at the
recent Greece bail out is a good example, both of the
costs and the imperfect integration. In the future, there will
be no place for strict territoriality in the EU, at least not in
the fundamental taxes such as those taxing income (indivi-
dual or corporate). However, the future is still a long way
from here.
2.3. The Essential Issues of Loss Relief in a
Transnational Setting
At least the following four basic elements must be borne in
mind when assessing and comparing any given system of
losses compensation and the extent to which foreign losses
are taken into account:30
(a) When was the loss incurred? Time being the main
reason behind the offsetting of losses in income taxes, thus
allowing to take into account a period greater than a year, it
also determines the extent and mode that the loss may be
offset. So the first question would be what is the tax period
taken into account for the assessment of income, as well as
what criteria are used for the accounting of revenues and
expenses for tax purposes (cash or accrual methods).
Then, a tax system may allow for a carry forward of losses
or, in some cases, a carry-back (against past profits). This of
course is always linked to a more fundamental question,
which is to what extent do periodical taxes on income
adequately reflect the ability to pay, seeing as income, and
mostly business income, is not necessarily annual. After
Marks & Spencer, a final temporary element would be to
determine whether the loss is terminal or temporary.
(b) Where was the loss incurred; was it in the same country
or in a foreign country and, in this case, was it EU or non-
EU; in both cases, is there a Double Taxation Convention or
agreement (DTC or DTA) in force or, finally, was the loss
incurred in a low tax jurisdiction?31
The source versus residence debate and perspectives are as
old as international taxation, which is based upon the
dichotomy between residence and source; a country where
a relative permanent residence takes place and a country
where income, in its various forms, is obtained. However,
this traditional dichotomy is no longer so clear, as source is
not always identifiable and residence, particularly for enti-
ties, is only the start of the tax powers allocation process, as
when shareholders reside mainly abroad, the CIT, an ever
residence-based tax, actually turns into a ‘source tax’ on the
profit, which will then be paid to shareholders in another
State.32
The problem of transnational losses combines two major
issues of loss compensation, as different countries will have
different rules on qualification (what type of loss may be
offset against what) and time frame (the question of when).
However, there may also be different rules on what type of
losses may be imported or exported (which would be the
questions, where from or where to).
(c) What type of loss and how much does it account to? As
most fundamental issues when dealing with tax losses, this
question is related to the definition of the tax base. There
may be limits in offsetting losses from different types of
income. Depending on whether the tax system follows a
schedular tax system (such as, for example, dual taxation)
as opposed to a global system, the question will arise whether
losses are transferable between the different schedules; would
for instance a capital loss be allowed to offset any other type
of income? Should imputed costs be taken into account? May
all types of revenues be offset with each other or are there
separate pools, for instance for active and passive incomes?
Generally, accounting for losses and loss compensation
(International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS),
International Accounting Standards (IAS) 2) is located in
three distinct tax accounting rules: impairment of non-
depreciable assets, allowance for bad debt, and loss carry-
over, of which we will pay attention to the third, also known
as inter-temporal loss relief.
Eventually, how much the cross-border loss amounts to
will depend on the type of investment as well as on the
method employed to curb double taxation. There are
27 Note that the ability-to-pay principle is fundamentally an economic notion, one that derives from the sheer logic of taxing only sources of wealth, income, or consumption.
Legally, the ability-to-pay principle is a notion that intends to shape taxes, in order to make them fairer and coherent with the principle of material equality.
28 Scho¨n, supra n. 9, 819.
29 C. Closa Montero, ‘Citizenship of the Union and Nationality of Member States’, Common Market Law Review 2 (1995): 495 y ss. V. Ruiz Almendral, ‘Entre la discriminacio´n y la
armonizacio´n: el re´gimen fiscal del no residente en Espan˜a a la luz del Derecho Comunitario’, Estudios Financieros 307 (2008): 3–68, <http://uc3m.academia.edu/
VIOLETARUIZALMENDRAL>.
30 See Commission, Company Taxation in the Internal Market, 247. A. Cordewener et al., ‘The Tax Treatment of Foreign Losses: Ritter, M & S, and the Way Ahead (Part One)’,
European Taxation (2004): 137 et seq.
31 Some countries, like Spain, bestow a differential treatment for losses incurred in low tax jurisdictions.
32 Scho¨n, supra n. 4, 68–69.
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different ways of obtaining income in another country,
typically described as direct or indirect investment.
I followed an old method that tries to estimate the level
of foreign ownership of the productive assets in a given
country (land, factories, or other means of production).33
For our purposes, foreign direct investment (FDI) entails a
minimum substance and long-term participation and inte-
gration in the economy of another country, which will
normally entail the incorporation of a subsidiary, a joint
venture, or similar structures. Foreign indirect investment
is a much looser category that would entail all non-
permanent investments, most of them giving way to pas-
sive income, the clearest example being portfolio investment
with no element of control34 (private investment in secu-
rities, and so on). The two categories are not legal, or have a
set meaning, but do help understand international tax
rules.
In an international setting, quantifying a loss will depend
not only on the accounting system that the income tax is
following. In the case of cross-border losses, how much is the
(transferable) loss will eventually depend on the method
employed in order to avoid double taxation. Thus, while
the exemption method will typically not allow a foreign
loss, the credit method will. Losses may be offset within
certain limits, such as the total net revenue accrued, or a part
of a certain revenue when different ‘baskets’ can be partially
merged. Finally, the loss may also be taken into account in
an indirect manner, by way for example of granting a
depreciation of (losing) foreign assets.
Article 23 of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development Model Convention (OECD
MC) proposes two broad methods to avoid double taxation
of income: the exemption method, by which all income
obtained in the Source (S) State will be exempt in the
Residence (R) State,35 and the credit method, by which R
will tax the worldwide income of the taxpayer, then allow-
ing her to credit taxes that may have been paid in S (typi-
cally, withholding or non-resident taxes). In their basic
versions, the first method will not allow losses, as they will
also be exempt, while the credit method will always take
them into account in the determination of the worldwide
income. The underlying rational of these methods is either
to protect Capital Export Neutrality (CEN) in the case of
the credit method or guarantee Capital Import Neutrality
(CIN) in the case of the exemption method.
A last fundamental issue when assessing the transfer of
losses is the method to compute them, which is to say, the
method by which the taxable base has been quantified. As
long as no CCCTB is established, methods vary largely in
different Member States, even if the uneven adoption of the
IFRS has evened things slightly, albeit only for listed com-
panies (since 200536). Of course the problem is that, where
there is no common definition of the base, there is also no
common definition of what a loss is.37 This is related to
other issues, such as what rules, the subsidiary’s or the
parent’s place of residence, shall be applied.
(d) Who can claim what losses, is it the same taxpayer –
with or without a PE; is it a group of entities, have the losses
been incurred by a subsidiary? This is of course related to
the bigger issues of: (i) the notion of ownership, whether it
is direct or indirect, whether it entails ownership in the
continental civil-law sense or has a broader meaning, such as
economic control; and (ii) ownership thresholds. In general
terms, strict direct ownership rules are established, as well as
high ownership thresholds (of 75% and more), in order to
curb avoidance.38
With regard to losses accrued by PEs, there are two (but
in practice three) systems that permit the losses to be partial
or totally relieved.
First, the credit or imputation method will allow the princi-
pal to credit the tax paid by the PE or to take into account
the PE’s losses when determining its (the principal’s) tax
base. In many cases, the Residence State may limit the
credit to the tax that would have otherwise been paid had
it been a resident PE, therefore making it less advantageous
to establish a PE in a higher taxing jurisdiction.
Second, the exemption method, by which neither profits nor
losses are taken into account when determining the princi-
pal’s tax base. This is in practice the less attractive method,
as a PE, especially a new established one, will normally
accrue start-up losses. The method is lethal when the Host
State does not allow or severely limits the carry forward of
PE losses.
The exemption method may be softened by what is
actually a third method – the deduction or reintegration method,
which allows the taxpayer (principal) to offset losses
33 According to the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, FDI can be defined as the ‘ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one foreign person, or entity, of 10 percent or more of
the voting securities of an incorporated U.S. business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated U.S. business enterprise’. As the top country in the world in terms of
receiving FDI, the USA has substantial data on this issue; see <www.investamerica.gov/home/iia_main_001155.asp>.
34 The notion of control having substantial implications in International Tax Law, as it will determine a certain, often more advantageous, treatment when it is substantial (i.e., is
above a certain threshold), at least from the perspective of the EC Parent Subsidiary Directive. Not so from a CFC legislation perspective; see generally W. Scho¨n, ‘International
Tax Coordination for a Second-Best World (Part 2)’, World Tax Journal (February 2010): 66–68.
35 There are actually two types of exemption method: tax exemption and base exemption, by which the tax base that occurred in the host State is not taken into account at all in the
home State. This latter method is also known as territorial taxation.
36 Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 requires that for each financial year starting on or after 1 Jan. 2005, publicly traded companies governed by the law of a Member State are, under
certain conditions, to prepare their consolidated accounts in conformity with international accounting standards as defined in Art. 2 of that Regulation. At present, the latest
consolidated version of the IFRS adopted and binding in the EU is the Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1126/2008 of 3 Nov. 2008, Adopting Certain International Accounting
Standards in Accordance with Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
37 See Commission, Company Taxation in the Internal Market, 247.
38 See ibid., 335–336.
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incurred in S, albeit only temporarily, so that once the PE is
profitable again the loss is ‘recaptured’ by R. This way the
loss is only taken into account once, and the taxpayer
avoids the cash flow problem of having to wait for profits
in its PE in order to offset the loss. As we will see, particu-
larly after the ECJ AMID case, this would be the only way
to make the exemption method compatible with EU Law,
and specifically with the freedom of establishment, when
applied to a PE.
The following example may serve to clarify this:39 in year
n, Losing realizes a profit of 1,000 in R and a loss of the same
amount in S. That year the loss is compensated in R, so no
tax ensues. In year nþ 1, Loosing realizes a profit of 1,000 in
each R and S. That year, the taxable income in R will be
2,000, while in S there will be a zero tax base (-1,000 þ
1,000). In this case, the taxable income for the taxpayer
corresponds with his actual economic income.
With this method, the fear of double dipping that has
been expressed by Member States before the ECJ may very
well be unfounded. Even in those cases where this risk may
actually be present, the question is whether there is a less
restrictive measure than simply denying the possibility of
loss relief.
In most cases, the situation will be different for subsidi-
aries, as no immediate cross-border loss relief will be
granted to the parent for losses incurred by its foreign
subsidiaries. When it is done, it will normally follow the
above-mentioned reintegration method (as in France). Like-
wise, in some cases, the Resident State of the parent com-
pany may allow it to write off the devaluated assets, by
means of building up a provision that will reflect the lower
value of the shares or participations. This certainly allows
taking into account losses, even if in many cases only once
these are permanent, for write-off rules may be quite harsh
in that regard. Note that the provision will be tax deduc-
tible only in relation to the shares’ or participations’ original
value of acquisition, which means the excess cannot be
carried forward. The result being that, at least in many
cases, part of the loss will, in fact, be lost.
Finally, for groups of companies there will normally be
consolidation regimes available, but rarely will they be
extended to foreign subsidiaries, which is why a preferred
method of foreign investment will be to start up as a PE and
then if it becomes permanently profitable, transform it into
a subsidiary.40 Moreover, even when consolidation is possi-
ble, there will be different rules concerning ownership
thresholds for subsidiaries, as well as the notion of owner-
ship itself (whether or not it also implies elements of control
or not, among others).
Most tax systems have some regime that allows for the
aggregation of profits and losses of different entities belong-
ing to the same undertaking, so that losses may be offset
against profits, either horizontally (between different
branches or subsidiaries) or vertically (between a parent
company and its subsidiaries). There are three traditional
systems for taking into account foreign subsidiary losses: a
total worldwide consolidation system (France, Denmark), a
system where the parent company may write off devaluated
foreign participations, and a mechanism that allows a claw-
back (Spain, Germany, Austria. . .).41 A third system would
only allow taking into account losses when the assets are
transmitted and the loss is thus final.
At present, there are different systems of taking into
account losses in the EU, just as there are also different ways
of assessing the taxable base. These were summarized by
above quoted 2006 Commission Communication on the tax
treatment of losses in cross-border situations. All Member
States grant a relief for losses deriving from domestic opera-
tions, which are undertaken by a single company. In the
case of groups of companies, most EU countries apply some
type of group taxation system that will take losses into
account, treating the group as an entity, thus disregarding
the rest (The Netherlands), or allowing a great scope of
integration of the taxable income among the group.
Losses deriving from other EU Member States operations
may, however, not be entirely corrected, as this will depend
on the method used to avoid double taxation. Thus, while
the credit method will normally take all losses into account,
the exemption method will not. In the case of groups of
companies, currently only some Member States apply their
group taxation systems to include cross-border losses.
Different systems coexist under the common heading of
tax consolidation, depending on whether the entities con-
forming the group are disregarded for tax purposes (as in
the Dutch system), the extent of the consolidation or
whether only losses are taken into account or intra-group
operations are generally disregarded. Most EU tax conso-
lidation regimes follow partial pooling systems, by which
the taxable base of the different entities are pooled together
Year State of Residence Source State
N þ1,000 (profit) Tax-
able income¼ 0 (loss
compensation)
1,000 (loss)
N þ 1 þ1,000 Taxable
income ¼ 2,000
(1,000 þ 1,000)
þ1,000 Taxable
income ¼ 0
(loss carry-over)
39 See a similar example in CFE, supra n. 8, n. 4.
40 Commission, Company Taxation in the Internal Market, 251.
41 This second system is allowed by the Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 Jul. 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries
of different Member States; see J.M. Caldero´n Carrero, ‘Reflexiones al hilo de la STJUE X Holding BV sobre el re´gimen de consolidacio´n en el Impuesto sobre Sociedades, la
‘‘importacio´n’’ de pe´rdidas extranjeras y el Derecho de la Unio´n Europea’, Cro´nica Tributaria (October 2010, forthcoming).
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and taxed jointly, while the Entities forming the group
maintain their own tax obligations. Both intra-group con-
tribution and group relief are systems where the economic
unity of the group is taken into account, by means or
targeted tax relief rules. The main difference among the
two is that the first allows a pooling of both benefit and
losses, while the group relief systems only allow the trans-
fer of intra-group losses, so no real transfer of income is
needed. Some countries, such as notably Spain, use a
portfolio devaluation, which may well have the effect of a
loss relief system.42 This is an imperfect offsetting of the
losses in any event, as the system merely allows taking into
account, for tax purposes, the devaluation of the portfolio
owned or controlled by the resident entity.43
The coexistence of such different systems is worrying to
the extent that it creates serious obstacles to further EU
market integration.44 Clearly, there are currently major
limits on cross-border loss relief, which in many cases lead
to economic double taxation. This happens not only because
most EU members do not recognize losses of foreign sub-
sidiaries but also because losses of PEs can often only be
offset against headquarter profits under limited circum-
stances. In any event, one of the conclusions of the above-
mentioned 2006 Commission’s Cross-Border Loss Relief
Communication is that, by and large, the greater distortion
for the internal market derives from the absence of a loss
relief system for groups of companies. According to the
Commission, the situation also constitutes a strong disin-
centive to invest in other Member States, at the same time
that it favours larger Member States, with a greater market
for operating. It is also substantially more favourable to
large companies. In fact, the situation is also particularly
disadvantageous for small- and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), which face particular problems in cross-border
situations, as the Commission’s Communication on a
Home State Taxation Pilot Scheme pointed out.45 In the
end, the distortions that arise because of the limited access
to cross-border loss relief result in less competition, higher
consumer prices, and less overall efficiency.
3. OPTIONS FOR LOSS RELIEF IN
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN
TAX LAWS
3.1. The Odd Couple: EU and
International Tax Law
There are several fundamental problems when trying to
reconcile EU Law with International Tax Law. The main
one is, to put it in a nutshell, that International Tax Law
does not exist, while EU Tax Law is incomplete and asym-
metric. As for the first, there exists, of course, a set of
international rules and guidelines that are followed by most
OECD countries, as well as a growing number of non-
OECD.46 This set of rules may also be somewhat coordinated,
thus being closer to a regime47 than to a mere set of tax
agreements, but it is still far from being a system of law, one
that is enforceable, foreseeable, or amendable by common and
ordinary standards. This is the starting point of any analysis
of the relationship between EU and International Tax Law.
When addressing non-discrimination issues in the two
law areas (let us call them that for the time being), another
fundamental issue is that the very basis of International Tax
Law lies in residents and non-residents not being in com-
parable situations, which applies to transfer of losses as well
as to many other tax provisions.48 This may sometimes also
be the result of an EU Law case, but it is not the basis of EU
Tax Law, in fact the opposite may be true.49 The larger
picture is that comparing EU and International Tax Law is
too much of an asymmetric comparison; the EU is an
integration organization, and a system of law (Costa/ENEL),
whose aims go beyond the coordination of certain policies.
Political integration is an end objective and this shapes the
42 Ibid.
43 See this system in ibid. As this last author has pointed out, this portfolio depreciation system serves as a loss relief only if it can be interpreted that s. 12.3 of the Corporation Income
Tax Act (TRLIS) is also applicable to EU subsidiaries, something that is not crystal clear from the article itself, although it may be derived from the Administrative ruling RDGT
de 1 marzo 2010, V-0368-10. Otherwise, this provision will be clearly contrary to EU law, especially after the ECJ case of 29 Mar. 2007, C-347/04, Rewe Zentralfinanz.
44 As pointed out in the above-mentioned Commission Communications, Towards an Internal Market without Tax Obstacles (2001), Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border
Situations (2006), and Coordinating Member States’ Direct Tax Systems in the Internal Market (2006), and had also be pointed out at the Ruding report (Commission of the
European Communities (ed.), Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation (Brussels/Luxembourg: EC Commission, 1992), 14 et seq., 60 et seq., and 299 et seq.
(Annex 3B), there is extensive literature on this issue. Among others, see the following two works: B. Knobbe-Keuk, ‘The Ruding Committee Report – An Impressive View of
European Company Taxation for the Year 2000’, EC Tax Review 1 no. 1 (1992): 22 et seq.; and, more recently, M. Aujean, ‘The CCCTB Project and the Future of European
Taxation’, in Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, ed. M. Lang, P. Pistone, J. Schuch & C. Staringer (Linde: Wien, 2008), 25 et seq.
45 COM (2005) 702 final.
46 See, in this regard, E. Baistrocchi, ‘The Use and Interpretation of Tax Treaties in the Emerging World: Theory and Implications’, British Tax Review 4 (2008): 353 et seq.
47 See the controversial theory on the existence of an authentic tax regime by R. Avi-Yonah, ‘International Tax as International Law’, Tax Law Review 57 (2004): 498 et seq. and, more
recently, R.S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law. An Analysis of the International Tax Regime (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 8 et seq.
48 For instance, OECD MC, Commentary on Art. 24, on tax discrimination, para. 77, states that: ‘Since the paragraph relates only to the taxation of resident enterprises and not to
that of the persons owning or controlling their capital, it follows that it cannot be interpreted to extend the benefits of rules that take account of the relationship between a resident
enterprise and other resident enterprises (e.g. rules that allow consolidation, transfer of losses or tax-free transfer of property between companies under common ownership). For
example, if the domestic tax law of one State allows a resident company to consolidate its income with that of a resident parent company, paragraph 5 cannot have the effect to force
the State to allow such consolidation between a resident company and a non-resident parent company. This would require comparing the combined treatment of a resident
enterprise and the non-resident that owns its capital with that of a resident enterprise of the same State and the resident that owns its capital, something that clearly goes beyond
the taxation of the resident enterprise alone.’
49 Ruiz Almendral, ‘Entre la discriminacio´n y la armonizacio´n: el re´gimen fiscal del no residente en Espan˜a a la luz del Derecho Comunitario’, 34 et seq.
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EU’s economic constitution of which tax laws form a rele-
vant part.
Just as EU freedoms have as their main objective the
integration of the common EU market,50 tax integration
or tax harmonization in the EU mainly aimed to eliminate
tax obstacles or distortions. Initially, the EU Treaties had an
obvious bias towards coordinating indirect taxation, which
is partly explained because that was the most important
type of taxation in the 1950s, and because being so under-
developed, it was hard to imagine that direct taxes would
ever pose major problems to EU market integration. Sover-
eignty issues came later; and by the time direct taxes had
become sophisticated enough to pose problems for EU
economic integration, it was too late to take if from the
hands of the Governments, for they soon came to represent
the lion’s share of the tax revenues.
Harmonization in direct taxes has followed a bumpy
road, if there was ever a road. As the Commission pointed
out, at best proposals in tax issues have been addressed in
too isolated a manner, without putting them in the context
of their broader objective, which is the political integration
of the EU.51 The four main Directives affecting direct taxes
(the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the Merger Directive, the
Savings Directive, and the Interest-Royalty Directive),52
albeit limited in scope, are the tipping point towards a more
proactive approach in direct harmonization, which has been
largely undertaken by the ECJ, bringing about a sort of
‘silent revolution’.53
The ECJ plays a major role in the economic integration of
the EU. The central interpretative element for the Court is,
and can only be, market integration in the EU. As there are
no tax principles as such embedded in the Treaties, the non-
discrimination principle must be interpreted in the light of
the said market integration. Access to the market protects
all EU movements – of persons, capital, establishments – so
that discriminations and restrictions that the agents may
suffer are taken into account not only when assessing the
conditions to access the market (Source State perspective),
as was the case Commission/France (better known as Avoir
fiscal, ECJ, 28 January 1986 (270/83)) or Schumacker
(ECJ, 14 February 1995, C-279/93), but also when asses-
sing access to other markets from the Resident State per-
spective, where the restriction may be imposed by that same
state (as was the case in ICI (16 July 1998, C-264/96),
Manninen (ECJ, 7 September 2004, C-319/02) or even
Marks & Spencer (ECJ, 13 December 2005, C-446/03)).
The analysis undertaken by the Court on the application
and scope of the fundamental freedoms revolves around the
central notion of non-discrimination and restriction when
accessing the EU market. This way of reasoning has experi-
enced an interesting evolution in the past years that I will
briefly refer to.54 At first, the main objective is to curb any
discrimination, barring overriding reasons in the public inter-
est. In the ICI case, the Court introduced the notion that a
tax measure may impose a restriction on the exercise of the
economic freedoms, which has come to be known as the
‘Home State restriction’, as it refers to restrictions imposed
by the Residence State.55 So there may be a restriction
without there being a discrimination. Of course the main
problem with the notion of restriction still is that its appli-
cation to direct taxes may seem strange, as it was a notion
originally shaped to be applied to indirect taxes, to prevent
them from becoming barriers within the EU market.56
Using market integration as the main interpretative cri-
terion has many consequences for the shaping of a tax law
doctrine. The most obvious one is that the so-called princi-
ple of neutrality acquires great relevance. This is at best
confusing, not only because neutrality per se is not really a
principle – in tax or other areas – but because the very
notion that a tax can be neutral is misleading, at best,57
and probably biased towards a low impact, low pressure tax
system that does not really exist in the EU. The bottom line
here is that this purported neutrality is, in fact, not neutral
at all.58
Furthermore, because the ECJ naturally does not take
into account the main objective of a tax system and its
connection to public spending, the notion of fiscal interest
of the states is skewed and has come to be interpreted as an
element that is contrary to the interest of the EU as a sum,
which is only understandable in a very narrow sense. The
50 On the economic case law of the ECJ, see M. Poiares Maduro, We the Court. The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998),
61 et seq. With an emphasis on taxation, see C. Sacchetto, ‘ECJ Direct Tax Cases and Domestic Constitutional Principles: An Overview’, in Comparative Fiscal Federalism. Comparing
the European Court of Justice and the US Supreme Court’s Tax Jurisprudence, ed. R.S. Avi-Yonah, J.R. Hines, Jr. & M. Lang (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2007), 2.
51 European Commission, COM (2001) 260 final.
52 Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 Jul. 1990 on the Common System of Taxation Applicable to Mergers, Divisions, Transfers of Assets and Exchanges of Shares Concerning
Companies of Different Member States (‘Merger Directive’); Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 Jul. 1990 on the Common System of Taxation Applicable in the Case of Parent
Companies and Subsidiaries in Different Member States, (‘Parent-Subsidiary Directive’); Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 Jun. 2003 on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form
of Interest Payments (‘Savings Directive’); Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 Jun. 2003 on a Common System of Taxation Applicable to Interest and Royalty Payments Made
between Associated Companies of Different Member States (‘Interest-Royalties Directive’).
53 F. Vanistendael, ‘Tax Revolution in Europe: The Impact of Non-discrimination’, European Taxation 40, nos 1–2 (January–February, 2000): 4.
54 A. Garcı´a Prats, Imposicio´n directa, no discriminacio´n y derecho comunitario, 46 et seq.
55 Sacchetto, supra n. 50, 3.
56 F. Vanistendael, ‘The Compatibility of the Basic Economic Freedoms with the Sovereign National Tax Systems of the Member States’, EC Tax Review 3 (2003): 138.
57 Neutrality is a myth, as A. Garcı´a Prats points out at: ‘Incidencia del Derecho Comunitario en la configuracio´n jurı´dica del Derecho Financiero (y III): Principios de justicia
tributaria vs. Derecho Comunitario’, 739 and 740. In the end, taxes cannot by nature be neutral, see F. Neumark, Grundsa¨tze gerechter und o¨konomisch rationaler Steuerpolitik
(Tu¨bingen: J. C. B. Mohr-Paul Siebeck, 1970), 261. Most recently, see Murphy & Nagel, supra n. 15, 56.
58 I have dealt largely with this issue in V. Ruiz Almendral, Estabilidad presupuestaria y gasto pu´blico en Espan˜a (La Ley-Wolters Kluwer, 2008), 34 et seq.
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fiscal interest of the States is not really a principle common
to all Member States but rather a defining element of every
tax system that is legitimized because it serves the financing
of public spending, therefore also curbing or avoiding future
deficits, which is also an EU objective. In short, it should
not be an element that is deemed to run counter to the
economic freedoms.59 Conversely, Member States are prob-
ably not always aware that they probably would be defend-
ing their own tax interest best by allowing greater tax
coordination.
The past excursus should allow us to put in perspective
the way the Court takes into account International Tax
Law and what conclusions can be derived thereof. In par-
ticular when examining tax law in the light of non-
discrimination, the Court has often made references to
the OECD MC and its Commentaries, which may some-
times reflect an implicit acceptation of the conventional
regime in International Tax Law (Gerritse, ECJ, 12 June
2003 (C-234/01), paragraph 45). Such Court references to
what in reality is soft law in international taxation has
helped these non-rules acquire a binding force.60 How-
ever, the influence goes in both directions, so that ECJ
rulings may also be exercising a decisive influence upon
the Commentaries.61
The main question here is whether these references are
erratic or even ornamental, or rather reflect a conviction by
the Court that the OECD MC is a sound blueprint for the
allocation of taxing powers among Member States. This is
probably hardly the case, as the Court does not always follow
the OECD logic even when quoting it.62 However, the
problem nonetheless is that the system (sic) of allocating
taxing rights designed by the OECD is hard from perfect,
and it is widely used because it is convenient and agreed,
not because there is a true belief that it is the perfect or fair
solution.63
Thus, the protection granted by the international tax of
non-discrimination (Article 24 of the OECD MC) is nar-
rower in scope than the principle of non-discrimination in
the EU,64 which is mainly explained because their
objectives are also fundamentally different. There are at least
three differences.65
First, the resident versus non-resident opposition works
differently in EU and International Tax Law. For the former,
residents and non-residents may be comparable when a non-
justified discrimination affecting a fundamental freedom is
at stake. That type of analysis is simply unfeasible in the
light of Article 24 of the OECD MC that precisely departs
from residents and non-residents being in totally different
situations. This fundamental difference stems directly from
the notion of EU citizenship, which is seldom quoted in
relation to tax cases in the EU, but that fundamentally
shapes the reasoning of the Court, even if the principle is
not directly quoted.66
Second, EU Law does not only prohibit discrimination
but also restrictions to the internal market, thus curbing
measures that may not be establishing a differential treat-
ment among residents and non-residents as happened in the
Safir case (ECJ, 28 April 1998 (C-118/96)).67
Third, the scope of non-discrimination in EU is naturally
broader, not only because it does not limit itself to direct
taxes or to taxes for that matter, but because it also takes
into account differences of treatment, which are based on
where the investment has taken place.
Of course the fundamental difference, as I mentioned
above, is that while Article 24 of the OECD Model Tax
Convention (MTC) intends to smooth and facilitate economic
transactions,68 the approach of the Court is shaped by the
notion of EU citizenship, which among other things explains
that fundamental freedoms are protected also when no real
economic activity has been undertaken. In addition, it should
be borne in mind the limited scope of section 24, by nature
and because of historic reasons. Thus, its reference to citizen-
ship was initially shaped after the Free Trade Agreements,
and it loses meaning and force in an international tax system
that is largely based upon the notion of residency.69
A final and fundamental issue when dealing with EU and
International Tax Law is how Double Taxation Agreements
are accommodated by the former. This is of course a theme
59 See, in this regard, W. Scho¨n, ‘Playing Different Games? Regulatory Competition in Tax and Company Law Compared’, Common Market Law Review 42 (2005): 339 et seq.
60 Thus incorporating International soft law to EU law. See J.M. Caldero´n Carrero, ‘Una introduccio´n al Derecho Comunitario como fuente del Derecho Financiero y Tributario:
¿Hacia un ordenamiento financiero ‘‘bifronte’’ o ‘‘dual’’?’, Revista Espan˜ola de Derecho Financiero 132 (2006): 708 et seq.
61 J.M. Caldero´n & A. Martı´n Jime´nez name as an example the proposal to modify the taxation of services (OECD, The Tax Treaty Treatment of Services: Proposed Commentary
Changes, 8 Dec. 2006), which may have been influenced by the Gerritse, Conijn, and Scorpio cases; see A. Martı´n Jime´nez & J.M. Caldero´n Carrero, ‘La inaplazable necesidad de
reformar la tributacio´n del no residente sin establecimiento permanente: la STJCE Scorpio’, Jurisprudencia Tributaria Aranzadi 21 (2006).
62 Vid. M. Lang, ‘Double Taxation and EC Law’, in Comparative Fiscal Federalism. Comparing the European Court of Justice and the US Supreme Court’s Tax Jurisprudence, ed. R.S.
Avi-Yonah, J.R. Hines, Jr. & M. Lang (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2007), 33.
63 Lang, supra n. 62, 34.
64 K. Van Raad, ‘Nondiscrimination from the Perspective of the OECD Model and the EC Treaty – Structural and Conceptual Issues’, in Comparative Fiscal Federalism. Comparing the
European Court of Justice and the US Supreme Court’s Tax Jurisprudence, ed. R.S. Avi-Yonah, J.R. Hines, Jr. & M. Lang (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2007), 55 et seq.
65 J.M. Caldero´n Carrero & A. Martı´n Jime´nez, ‘Artı´culo 24 MC OCDE. Principio de no discriminacio´n’, in Comentarios a los convenios para evitar la doble imposicio´n y prevenir la evasio´n
fiscal concluidos por Espan˜a, ed. AA.VV. (coord.): J.R. Ruiz Garcı´a & J.M. Caldero´n Carrero (A Corun˜a: Fundacio´n Pedro Barrie´ de la Maza-Instituto de Estudios Econo´micos de
Galicia, 2004), 1109.
66 Closa Montero, supra n. 29, 496 et seq.
67 See P.J. Wattel & B.J.M. Terra, European Tax Law (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2008), 53–54.
68 Van Raad, supra n. 64, 61.
69 Ibid., 56. Sobre la incipiente formacio´n de un sistema de Derecho tributario internacional, vid., R.S. Avi-Yonah, 2007, 8 et seq.
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much broader than this short article, but several elements
must be borne in mind. First, the EC Treaty advice that EU
Member States should try to curb double taxation (former
Article 293 of the EC Treaty) was not an imposition (some-
thing that is clear after Gilly). That may explain its disap-
pearance from the Lisbon Treaty.70 As much as the Court
considers tax treaties to belong to domestic law, they must
abide by EU principles (Saint Gobain, STJCE de 21 de
September de 1999 (C-307/97)). There is no ban on Com-
munity action in this matter nor can it be interpreted that
the treaties consider ‘tax treaties form a cornerstone of fiscal
integration within the EC’.71 This may seem contradictory:
to say that Member States have exclusive powers to enter
into tax treaties but then establish that such treaties must
also abide by EU Law. However, it is no more contradictory
that the subsidiarity principle that allows Member States to
retain all powers on direct taxation, while forcing them to
abide by EU Law. It is finally a matter of allocation of
powers among the centre (in this case, the EU) and sub-
national entities (Member States in this case): An issue that
has long been resolved in the federalism and public law
literature (the German Bundestreue),72 which is to say, a bona
fide approach to the assignment of roles. When the Court
states that direct taxes are under the sovereignty of Member
States but that they must exercise their powers abiding by
essential EU Law, it is basically referring to the Bundestreue,
which also intends to avoid the emptying of a competent
(Ausho¨lung) by its abusive exercise from another entity.
The Lisbon Treaty refers to this principle for the first
time.73
The problems derived by and the justification of the ever
persistent divorce of Tax treaty law and Community law are
well known. As the 2005 European Commission report on
EC Law and Tax Treaties74 explains, the origin of this
separation lies in the initial focus by Community law on
indirect taxation, at the same time that DTAs normally deal
only with direct taxes (usually, taxes on income and capital,
sometimes also gift and inheritance taxes as well as wealth
taxes). However, the main difference lies in the objectives
that each area of law pursues. It may then be the case that
the way the questions are being posed is determining the
outcome in a way that is gravely misleading. Tax treaties are
just another type of domestic law: A specific one, true, and
one that is partly coordinated by a think tank such as the
OECD, in the case of DTAs concluded by Member States
but domestic law nevertheless. So the question is not so
much International law versus Community law; we should
not forget that they are not really ‘two branches of the law’ but
specific domestic law versus Community law.
There are a growing number of ECJ cases dealing with
the possible breach of EC freedoms that DTA agreed by
Member States may cause. This is partly explained by the
increased activism of the European Commission and the ECJ
in direct tax law cases.75 As it is generally known, after
repeating what has become known as the ‘ECJ direct tax law
mantra’, which states that ‘direct taxation does not as such
fall within the purview of the Community, the powers
retained by the Member States must nevertheless be exer-
cised consistently with Community law’,76 the Court goes
on to address specific issues where the inconsistency results
in a discrimination in the treatment of EU citizens and
economic activities.77
Of course the fundamental problem is not only the dif-
ferent width of their objectives; that DTA have as their
objective to curb double taxation (and since 2003, also
generally to prevent abuse), on the one hand, and that
Community law has a broader aim, political and economic
integration, on the other hand. In the end, DTAs will
always aim to establish a different treatment, not only
between the two signatory countries and the rest of the
world but also among them in a way. A DTA is not
celebrated on equal footing but rather reflects the economic
position of each country, thus creating differences between
the different DTAs signed by the same country. By nature,
DTAs are based upon the principle of reciprocity, which,
among other things, explains why ‘most favoured nation’
clauses, recommended in the GATT framework, have never
been endorsed by the OECD.
On the other hand, however, the Court is probably well
aware of what it would mean to make all DTAs be renego-
tiated again. Curbing double taxation may not be an EU
obligation, as most commentators point out,78 but it is
nevertheless a most important element in maintaining coor-
dination between tax systems that will allow a healthy level
of economic exchange. It may not be an EU Treaties objec-
tive in a direct manner, but it certainly serves the larger
objective of market integration. That is the real ‘elephant in
the room’ in many EU cases, and what probably explains the
70 As Aujean, supra n. 44, 29, has pointed out.
71 As suggested in Cordewener et al., supra n. 30, 139.
72 K. Hesse, Grundzu¨ge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Heidelberg: C.F. Mu¨ller Verlag, 1995), 116 et seq.
73 See, in this regard, M. Nieminen, ‘Abolition of Double Taxation in the Treaty of Lisbon’, European Taxation 64, no. 6 (2010).
74 Taxud E1/FR Doc (05) 2306, 9 Jun. 2005.
75 Poiares Maduro, supra n. 50, 61 et seq. and Sacchetto, supra n. 50, 2.
76 Judgment of the Court of 14 Feb. 1995, Case C-279/93, Schumacker, point 21; and judgments of 11 Aug. 1995, Case C-80/94, Wielockx, point 16; of 27 Jun. 1996, Case C-107/94,
Asscher, point 36; of 15 May 1997, Case C-250/95, Futura, point 19; of 28 Apr. 1998, Case C-118/96, Safir, point 21; of 16 Jul. 1998, Case C-264/96, ICI, point 19; etc.
77 Among other examples, the following cases can be quoted: ECJ 23 Sep. 2003, Case C-58/01, Oce´ Van der Grinten, point 54; of 12 Dec. 2002, Case C-385/00, F.W.L. de Groot v.
Staatssecretaris van Financie¨n, points 84, 94, 99 et. seq; of 8 Mar. 2001, Case C-397/98, Metallgesellschaft, point 71 et seq.; of 18 Nov. 1999, Case C-200/98, X AB et Y AB, points
10 and 31.
78 A. Cordewener, Europa¨ische Grundfreiheiten und nationales Steuerrecht, 877.
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murky and contradictory case law of the Court when it
comes to DTAs.
3.2. Double Taxation Agreement
Aspects of the Transfer of Losses
DTAs do not directly deal with systems of transfer of losses,
although there are certain aspects that are directly or indir-
ectly related and influence the possibility of offsetting
losses: the rules of allocation of costs to PEs’ head offices
(Article 7 of the OECD MC), the questions aroused by losses
within associated enterprises (Article 9 of the OECD MC),
capital losses (Article 13 of the OECD MC), and, inciden-
tally, the limitations on loss consideration under Limitation
on benefits (LOB) clauses (Article 22 of the US Model).
In addition, although the exemption method does not pre-
clude the Member State to take foreign losses into account
(Article 23 OECD MC, paragraph 44), in practice that is the
result in many cases. I will focus on the allocation of costs to
PE, as well as briefly mention the problem with LOB
clauses. Transfer pricing issues are of course connected to
the problem of transnational losses, as much as one of the
fundamental questions, as I will later point out, remains
whether the separate accounting and arm’s length principle
are really a good system of dividing taxing powers among
EU Member States.79
3.2.1. The Rules of Allocating Costs to PEs:
The Redrafting of Article 7 in the 2010
OECD MC
A PE is often defined as a ‘taxable presence’, a term that
seems taken out of a ghost movie, as it has no tangible
presence to be seen by all – for the PE is, after all, a non-
resident – but comes to light through the medium of Inter-
national Tax Law and its allocation of tax power rules. A PE
is a purely tax concept; unlike other types of taxpayers, such
as companies or individuals, it does not exist in the legal
world for purposes different than those of International Tax
Law.80
Apart from being a taxable presence, the PE is also a way
to establish a limit or threshold for source taxation. Broadly
speaking, there are two different methods or options to
assess the profits of a PE: the ‘functionally separate entity’
and the ‘relevant business activity’ approaches. The first is
widespread as it is recognized by the OECD MC and will
(most likely) continue to be.81 The notion of PE, or at least
the current one, has been incorporated by EU Law in an
indirect manner. For instance, in the CCCTB seminars,82 it
was suggested that the future CCCTB legislation departs
from the definition based on the OECD MC, completed
with eventual and future ‘detailed definitions and guidance
to reflect the specific nature of the internal market.’ So far,
we do not know what those will be.83
The notion and tax consequences of the PE have been
subject to thorough analysis and proposals of change in the
framework of the OECD, as the 2008 and 2010, and their
amended versions, show.84 Under the current version of the
OECD MC, approved on 22 July 2010 (what is now known
as the ‘Authorized OECD Approach’ or AOA), it is recom-
mended that PEs be assimilated, to a certain extent, to
resident entities. Up to a point, this ‘new approach’ of the
OECD in the new version of Article 7 purports a continuity
of the separate entity approach,85 which will be largely
based on economic substance rather than on legal dealings.
This of course raises in my view many questions, which
I will only briefly mention here, for they deserve to be the
object of a different article; first, the feasibility of relying
basically on substantial operations and not legal dealings;
second, whether it will be adopted by countries in their
domestic legislations and whether it will be also adopted in
DTA; third, whether business will be in a position to
undertake a full functional analysis (and deal with the
79 In this regard, see the recent and thorough study by N. Herzig, M. Teschke & C. Joisten, ‘Between Extremes: Merging the Advantages of Separate Accounting and Unitary
Taxation’, Intertax 38, nos 6–7 (2010): 334–349.
80 See J. Sasseville & A.A. Skaar, ‘General Report’, IFA, Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International Vol. 94a: Is There a Permanent Establishment?, 2009 Vancouver Congress, 22 et seq.
In Spain, see A. Garcı´a Prats, El Establecimiento Permanente (Madrid: Tecnos, 1996), 39 et seq.
81 See OECD, ‘Report on Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments’, <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/41/45689524.pdf>, version approved last 22 Jul. 2010.
82 See, in particular, Working Paper 57 (para. 7), which, like the rest of CCCTB documents, is available online at <http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/
common_tax_base/article_4650_en.htm>.
83 Of course the problem with using the OECD (pre-2010) Model PE notion, as C. Staringer has pointed out, is that it is highly disputed, so the reference alone does not necessarily
eliminate uncertainty; C. Staringer, ‘Requirements for Forming a Group’, in Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, ed. M. Lang, P. Pistone, J. Schuch & C. Staringer (Linde:
Wien, 2008), 124. In the same volume, see D. Hohenwarter, ‘Moving In and Out of a Group’, in Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, ed. M. Lang, P. Pistone, J. Schuch &
C. Staringer (Linde: Wien, 2008), 158 et seq.
84 See the recent work by J. Malherbe & P. Daenen, ‘Permanent Establishments Claim Their Share of Profits: Does the Taxman Agree?’, Bulletin for International Taxation (July 2010):
360 et seq., for a critical assessment of the changes.
85 As explained in the OECD, ‘Report on Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments’: ‘The interpretation of Article 7(2) under the authorised OECD approach is that a two-
step analysis is required. First, a functional and factual analysis, conducted in accordance with the guidance found in the Guidelines, must be performed in order to hypothesise
appropriately the PE and the remainder of the enterprise (or a segment or segments thereof) as if they were associated enterprises, each undertaking functions, owning and/or using
assets, assuming risks, and entering into dealings with each other and transactions with other related and unrelated enterprises. Under the first step, the functional and factual
analysis must identify the economically significant activities and responsibilities undertaken by the PE. This analysis should, to the extent relevant, consider the PE’s activities and
responsibilities in the context of the activities and responsibilities undertaken by the enterprise as a whole, particularly those parts of the enterprise that engage in dealings with
the PE. Under the second step, the remuneration of any dealings between the hypothesised enterprises is determined by applying by analogy the Article 9 transfer pricing tools (as
articulated in the Guidelines for separate enterprises) by reference to the functions performed, assets used and risk assumed by the hypothesised enterprises. The result of these two
steps will be to allow the calculation of the profits (or losses) of the PE from all its activities, including transactions with other unrelated enterprises, transactions with related
enterprises (with direct application of the Guidelines) and dealings with other parts of the enterprise (under step 2 of the authorised OECD approach)’ (13, para. 10).
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greater formal obligations that this might entail); and
fourth, how this method will work when the PE is not
formed by many people or the connections and contribu-
tions of the people are not clear enough. A final element of
concern is that the new (or newest) version does not seem to
close one correct interpretation of the notion of PE. The
basic idea behind the new concept seems to be in particular
to establish a threshold on the taxation of its profits.86
To the moment, subparagraphs 40 a) and c) of the
Commentaries have been replaced with the following text:
40. With regard to the basis of assessment of tax, the
principle of equal treatment normally has the following
implications:
a) Permanent establishments must be accorded the
same right as resident enterprises to deduct the trad-
ing expenses that are, in general, authorised by the
taxation law to be deducted from taxable profits. Such
deductions should be allowed without any restric-
tions other than those also imposed on resident enter-
prises [. . .]
c) Permanent establishments should also have the option that
is available in most countries to resident enterprises of carry-
ing forward or backward a loss brought out at the close of an
accounting period within a certain period of time (e.g. 5
years). It is hardly necessary to specify that in the case
of permanent establishments it is the loss on their
own business activities, which will qualify for such
carry-forward.87
Clearly, this approach will not solve the problem of loss
relief, which is entrenched in the separate accounting
method, or separate entity approach, that the OECD
intends to keep. The outcome for losses would have been
different, had the AOA been to support some version of the
‘relevant business activity approach’.88
In addition, it should be noted that even though the PE is
now closer to a subsidiary in the sense of being treated as an
entity that has its own assets (economically, not legally,
owned), the assimilation is not complete, so that the AOA
does not intend that subsidiaries and PEs be treated the
same way.89
In this regard, it is worth mentioning the proposal
recently put forward by Herzig et al. to introduce some
unitary taxation elements in the prevailing, hard-to-change,
separate entity approach method.90
3.2.2. LOB Rules and Losses
LOB clauses may worsen the lack of loss relief as a result
of denying Treaty benefits to certain transactions, and
thus limit the possibilities of curbing double taxation.
These clauses are a US Model of DTA creation, specifi-
cally designed to curb treaty shopping structures by
excluding from treaty benefits non-qualifying residents
(inter alia, residents controlled or owned by residents in a
third Member State, not party of the DTA). Such clauses,
which in reality are no more than specific anti-abuse
clauses, have the main effect of denying treaty benefits to
an entity where the beneficial owner is located in the other
(third) state. They intend to set the personal scope of the
treaty, in order to prevent abuse.91 Because they are spe-
cific anti-abuse measures, in their wording a ‘subjective
test’ might be included, which may be in the form of a bona
fide clause.92
LOB clauses conflict with Community law in that they
introduce a difference of treatment contingent on residency.
Following the ECJ case law, and most notably Open Skies
(a non-tax case) and Lankhorst-Hohorst, inter alia, the ques-
tion remains unclear although a reform has not been
86 Malherbe & Daenen, supra n. 84, 360.
87 Author’s emphasis. This was suggested in 2009 (see OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Revised Draft of a New Art. 7 (Business Profits), 24 Nov. 2009) and has finally been
included in the revised Commentaries. See OECD, ‘2010 Update to the Model Tax Convention’, <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/43/45689328.pdf>, 74, para. 70.
88 OECD, ‘Report on Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments’, 23 et seq. (paras 61 et seq.).
89 There are many different divergences among the new PE notion and a subsidiary, such as the PE not having its own credit rating or that no withholding payments are levied on
internal dealings; see a critic in Malherbe & Daenen, 361.
90 Herzig et al., 335.
91 For example, Art. 17 of the Spain/USA DTA contains the following LOBC:
A person which is a resident of a Contracting State and derives income from the other Contracting State shall be entitled under this Convention to relief from taxation in that other
Contracting State only if (. . .)
(e) the income derived from the other contracting State is derived in connection with, or is incidental to, the active conduct by such person of a trade or business in the first-
mentioned State (other than the business of making or managing investments, unless these activities are carried on by a bank or insurance company); or
(f) the person deriving the income is a company in whose principal class of shares there is substantial and regular trading on a recognized securities exchange, or more than 50
percent of whose shares of each class is owned by a resident of that Contracting State in whose principal class of shares there is such substantial and regular trading on a recognized
securities exchange; or
(g) both of the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) more than 50 percent of the beneficial interest in such person (or in the case of a company, more than 50 percent of the number of shares of each class of the company’s
shares) is owned, directly or indirectly, by persons who are entitled to the benefits of the Convention under subparagraphs (. . .); and
(ii) the gross income of such persons is not used in substantial part, directly, or indirectly, to meet liabilities (including liabilities for interest or royalties) other than to
persons who are entitled to the benefits of the Convention.
92 Such as, from the same DTA: ‘A person which is not entitled to the benefits of the Convention pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 may, nevertheless, demonstrate to the
competent authority of the State in which the income arises that such person should be granted the benefits of the Convention. For this purpose, one of the factors the competent
authorities shall take into account is whether the establishment, acquisition, and maintenance of such person and the conduct of its operations did not have as one of its principal
purposes the obtaining of benefits under the Convention.’
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undertaken yet.93 The incompatibility of many LOB
clauses, in particular of those contained in US DTA with
European Tax Law has been the subject of much scholarly
writing.94 After the Gottardo and Open Skies cases, it is clear
that such LOB clauses will not be aligned with EU Law if
they imply a discrimination of an EU resident, not signatory
of the DTA. Of course Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT
Group Litigation (C-374/04, 2006) did allow intra-EU LOB,
but there are sufficient differences with Open Skies to inter-
pret that the latter is still valid EU case law.95 This is relevant
because LOB clause limit the transfer of losses by excluding
the possibility of applying rules to avoid double taxation.
3.3. The EU Initiatives on Tax Loss
Relief: The 2006 Commission
Communication and the
CCCTB Project
CITs, as other direct taxes, are not harmonized. There have
been several attempts to harmonize at least some aspects of
these taxes.96 So far, the only attempt that specifically
targeted losses is the short-lived 1990 Commission proposal
for a Directive on cross-border offsetting of losses between
group companies and between headquarters and branches.97
Since then, two proposals are worth mentioning: the
CCCTB project and the Commission’s 2006 proposal.
By far, the most ambitious project to fully harmonize
CITs is the CCCTB proposal,98 which seems to be stalled at
the moment, with no clear date in sight for its adoption. In
the unlikely event that it is adopted, the CCCTB would
substantially change the rules for trans-European loss relief,
for the core of the proposal is consolidation of the tax base
for EU operations. The CCCTB working groups concluded
by suggesting an unrestricted loss carry-forward system, and
ruling out loss carry-back,99 which would basically benefit
company groups,100 having access to establishing a conso-
lidated base. Such a system would not only free companies
from compliance with intra-group transfer pricing rules but
fundamentally allow ‘loss consolidation in a similar way to
many internal regimes a consolidated base would contribute
to creating a highly attractive area in which to do business
in Europe and would help to secure a stable tax base in a
competitive world environment’.101
This general principle would be completed by the follow-
ing rules.102
First, the pre-existing losses incurred by a taxpayer prior
to entering a CCCTB group would not be taken into
account but be offset against the share of the future con-
solidated profits attributed to this taxpayer, depending on
domestic rules. This is hardly surprising as it is the standard
practice in group taxation regimes103 but has been criticized
because it may contradict the idea of treating the CCCTB
group as a single economic unity.104 In addition, the rule
eventually approved should be completed by excluding the
losses arisen outside the group by an entity entering the
group via reorganization.105
Second, the losses accrued as a result of the consolidation
should be carried forward at group level and set off against
future consolidated profits, before the net profits are shared
out. This is done in order to avoid ‘stranded’ losses, that is,
losses that are kept in the companies for years to come, while
other companies of the group have profits.
Third, when an entity leaves the group no losses would be
attributed to it but would remain with the group. However,
if the group terminates, then the existing losses will be
attributed to the taxpayers that belonged to it, following
the sharing mechanism of the termination date. This
93 See, on the fundamental issues between LOB clauses and EU Law, R. Mason, ‘US Tax Treaty Policy and the European Court of Justice’, Tax Law Review 59 (2005): 65. F. Vega
Borrego, Limitation on Benefits on Double Taxation Conventions (Kluwer Law International, 2006), 237 et seq.
94 H. Becker & O. Tho¨mmes, ‘Treaty Shopping and EC Law’, European Taxation (1991): 173; Vega Borrego, supra n. 93; Wattel & Terra, supra n. 67, 115; D. Ramos Mun˜oz &
V. Ruiz Almendral, ‘Special Purpose Vehicles and International Tax Law (On the Perils of Applying Anti-abuse Doctrines to ‘‘Non-typical’’ Entities)’ (forthcoming).
95 Wattel & Terra, supra n. 67, 115 et seq., 773 et seq. One of the consequences of this is the growing inclusion of ‘derivative benefits’ clauses in order to extend Treaty benefits to
non-resident controlling companies (parents) that are resident in an EU Member State. These clauses extend benefits to asset-holding non-residents of the contracting states, which
have a DTA with one of the signatory countries of the Treaty. However, such clauses also pose problems of their own, are not widespread, and do not completely eliminate the
claims of discrimination. See, in this regard, R. Mason, ‘When Derivative Benefits Provisions Don’t Apply’, Tax Notes International (14 Aug. 2006): 565 et seq.
96 See an updated summary of different attempts, starting with the Neumark report, in Aujean, supra n. 44, 17 et seq.
97 Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Arrangements for the Taking into Account by Enterprises of the Losses of Their Permanent Establishments and Subsidiaries Situated
in other Member States, COM (90) 595 final, 6 Dec. 1990 (O.J. No. C 53, 28 Feb. 1991). The proposal was withdrawn because it was considered obsolete; COM (2001) 763 final/
2, 21 Dec. 2001. See Wattel & Terra, supra n. 67, 642 et seq. Among other elements, the draft Directive granted different treatment (and loss carry-over methods) to permanent
establishments and subsidia ies; it also suggested the opposite cross-border loss transfer method as the Marks & Spencer II case. See recently C.H. Panayi, ‘Reverse Subsidiarity and
EU Tax Law: Can Member States be Left to Their Own Devices?’, British Tax Review 3 (2010): 27–54.
98 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, Towards an Internal Market without Tax Obstacles:
A Strategy for Providing Companies with a Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for Their EU-Wide Activities, COM (2001) 582 final.
99 Commission: ‘Possible Elements of a Technical Outline. Annotated Version’, <CCCTB/WP057annotated\doc\en>, 20 Nov. 2007, 21.
100 Groups are based on ownership and control criteria and would also encompass permanent establishments. See, in this regard, Staringer and M. Lang et al., Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base (Linde: Wien, 2008), 117–136.
101 Commission, Possible Elements of a Technical Outline, 21.
102 Ibid., 26–27.
103 Y. Masui, ‘General Report. International Fiscal Association: Group Taxation’, Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International 89 (2004): 45 et seq.
104 In that regard, see Hohenwarter, supra n. 83, 179.
105 Ibid., 179.
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asymmetry has been criticized on the grounds that it is
inconsistent, not sufficiently justified, and eventually
unfair, in the case of a group that would be taken over by
another CCCTB group. In that case, the losses would not be
able to be set off.106 To the Commission, such an incon-
sistency is unavoidable.107
Not only the Commission but also the European Parlia-
ment108 specifically states the CCCTB proposal to be the
best alternative to establish a sound and smooth loss relief
system. The Resolution summarizes the problems that not
having such a system pose as well as the deficiencies of a
DTA network that does not address losses nor really enhance
cooperation on the different loss relief systems. It particu-
larly emphasizes the disadvantage for small countries and
SMEs of such discoordination; the first does not have a large
enough market and is in a worse position to absorb possible
losses, while the second is in a weaker position to undertake
cross-border investments amid uncertainty over loss relief.
The CCCTB is a large scale harmonization Project whose
ambition and scope make it the ideal means to tackle loss
transfer issues, as well as many others. However, this very
large scope may diminish the options for its adoption, at
least for the time being. The question then is whether a
more limited targeted approach would be feasible. In this
regard, the 2006 Commission’s Communication put for-
ward a proposal to establish a limited method to alleviate
the cross-border stranding of losses.109
The proposal was drafted in the wake of the Marks &
Spencer case, which as we will later on see, generated waves of
scholarly opinion. Today, more recent cases have contribu-
ted to better shape the ECJ case law on losses.
The Commission’s proposal focuses of groups of compa-
nies, where the major problems can be found, and it has a
very limited scope.110 The basic idea is for the State of the
parent company to only grant permanent loss relief for its
foreign subsidiaries in those cases where the losses were
final, the losing subsidiary having exhausted all possibilities
of loss relief in the Residence State. Finally, in order to avoid
tax avoidance by way of loss relief shopping, by which a group
of companies would be free to choose where to have their
losses set off, the measure would be limited to vertical
upward scenarios, that is, the parent would be deducting
the subsidiaries’ losses, but subsidiaries would not be able to
offset losses with each other.
The idea then would be to have EU-wide operating
corporate groups be taxed as if they were active only in
one, but only as far as this is possible. The proposed targeted
system must permit immediate, once-only, and vertical
upward (parent level) loss deduction. Income should not
be shifted for good from one Member State to another unless
losses are final and relief in the Member State where they
were generated is not possible. Finally, possibilities of abuse
must be curbed (although the Commission does not specify
how).
The Communication then offers three options that differ
among them in the treatment of future profits of the sub-
sidiary at the parent company level:
(a) The first option is a definite loss transfer (‘intra-
groups loss transfer’) within a domestic group where future
profits are not taken into account. In order to compensate
the loss of revenue of the Member State where the parent is
a resident, a clearing system between that State and the
State where the surrendering company is located could be
set up. The system would be designed so as to take into
account both differences in tax accounting rules and tax
rates, which would make it highly complicated and would
have too much of a changing nature, even for tax law
standards.
(b) The second option is a temporary loss transfer where
losses incurred by subsidiaries may be offset by their parent
entities immediately. The deducted loss is later on recap-
tured (‘deduction/reintegration method’), once profits
ensue, that is. The loss recapture is done by establishing
an additional tax burden at the parent company level. The
mechanism basically avoids the cash flow problems by
allowing immediate, albeit temporary, loss relief to the
parent with a losing subsidiary. As the Commission con-
cedes, this was exactly the method endorsed by the 1990
Draft Directive on losses,111 as well as being the system in
place in Germany until 1990.112 The system is easy to
implement, does not require the establishment of a clearing
system, and allows immediate relief at the level of the
parent.
(c) A third option would be to set up a system of
consolidated profits, by which all profits and losses of a
group that is present in more than one Member State are
taken into account. PE and subsidiaries would receive
equal treatment and the credit method would be applied
106 Apart from the annotated version, see a harsher critic in Hohenwarter, supra n. 83, 180–183. To Hohenwarter, the ultimate inconsistency remains in the fact that the CCCTB
proposal only treats the group as one entity in the case of losses but allows several taxpayers when there are profits, 181.
107 According to WP057, ‘Although there might appear to be an inconsistency between the treatment of companies leaving the group and the treatment of companies when a group
terminates this seems unavoidable. It seems reasonable to share out losses when the group terminates’, para. 105.
108 Resolution of 15 Jan. 2008 on Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations (2007/2144(INI), <www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef¼-//EP//
TEXTþTAþP6-TA-2008-0008þ0þDOCþXMLþV0//EN>.
109 Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee of 19 Dec. 2006 – Tax
Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations (COM (2006) 824), not published in the Official Journal.
110 Commission, Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, 7 et seq.
111 COM (90) 595 final. Proposal withdrawn OJ C 5, 9 Jan. 2004, 20.
112 See, in this regard, as well as a critic of the Commission’s proposals, T.P. Rodrigues, ‘Cross-Border Loss Relief: The Portuguese Rules and the Case for Harmonisation’,
The Offshore & International Taxation Review (2009).
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in order to curb double taxation; the tax paid by the
subsidiary at the State of its residence would be credited
against the tax paid by the parent with regard to the
subsidiaries’ income. According to the Commission, using
the credit method should eliminate opportunities for tax
arbitration, which are based on differences on the base and
tax rates. Profit distribution between members of the
group would be ignored for tax purposes. Because overall
tax would be paid in the parent’s State of residence, the
compliance cost may be high, because all tax bases would
have to be recalculated following the tax rules of the
residency of the parent, although SMEs may benefit from
the Home State taxation proposal.
Although the Commission does not directly endorse any
of the methods, it can be interpreted that the second is the
only feasible method, at least in the short term and as long
as no CCCTB project is endorsed.
4. THE ECJ CASE LAW ON
CROSS-BORDER LOSS RELIEF
In general terms, the Court now acknowledges the central
role played by the principle of territoriality in tax matters
and largely admits the balanced allocation of taxing powers
as a natural limit of tax integration in the EU,113 at least
while no further legislative action is completed. After Avoir
fiscal,114 almost every single ECJ case on direct taxation in
the last years begins by stating that Member States are free
to establish and regulate direct taxes, as long as they comply
with EU Law. The fact is Member States are hardly free to
exercise their legislative powers in direct taxes at will but
are seriously constrained by EU Law.115
In the following, I will briefly summarize what the ECJ
has concluded on the loss transfer systems that it has had the
opportunity to examine. Because this is but a summary of
case law, it can only be asystematic, for not all problems
have been dealt with by the Court.
4.1. The Principle: The Relevance of
Granting Cross-Border Loss Relief
In general, the Court is aware that taking into account losses
is tantamount to correctly determining the ability to pay of
an entity. In principle, not granting immediate loss relief
creates cash-flow disadvantage that can linger for years.
That disadvantage alone may conflict with the freedom of
establishments (among others, see C-397/98, Metallge-
sellschaft). Claiming tax avoidance issues has not generally
been effective for Member States, as the Court has always
rejected the risk of losing tax revenues as a reason to accept a
given tax provision.116 In addition, and as a matter of
principle, the Court does not allow domestic measures that
restrict the fundamental freedoms by constraining the com-
pensation of foreign losses in the Residence State,117 unless
of course a proportional justification is provided.
As we have seen, Member States’ tax legislations largely
grant loss relief for PEs, but the same is not true for foreign
subsidiaries. According to the Court, the freedom of estab-
lishment entails the right for EU residents to access the
market under the same conditions granted to the residents of a
given Member State (Saint-Gobain ZN, paragraph 35).
This means Member States’ tax laws must in principle
remain neutral with regard to the legal form by which
the economic activity is taking place (Avoir fiscal, Royal
Bank of Scotland (C-311/97), Saint-Gobain ZN). There will,
also in principle, be no such neutrality when a tax law may
contain a disincentive to create a subsidiary, or a PE, in
another Member State (Marks & Spencer (paragraphs 32 and
33), Keller Holding, STJCE 23 February 2006 (C-471/04),
paragraph 35).
However, it is at present particularly difficult to infer a
sound and coherent doctrine on cross-border loss relief from
the ECJ’s case law, as it is growingly complicated, as are as
well the systems granting loss relief. This explains the
increased sophistication of the arguments employed by the
Court, which is particularly evident in the recent X Holding
BV case. The Court is becoming aware that not all systems
are equal and it is hard to amend the dysfunctionalities that
are in reality created by an EU system that does not have a
harmonized tax base.
In the following, I will then focus on the main issues that
have been lately tackled by the Court with regard to losses:
the differences between PEs and subsidiaries, taking into
account the methods to tackle cross-border loss relief, and
the scope of consolidation regimes.
4.2. Whose Loss Is It and Where Did It
Arise? PEs Are Not (Always) Similar
to Subsidiaries
Who incurs the loss plays a significant role in the reasoning
of the Court. Despite the established case law in favour of
neutral entity forms in order to guarantee the freedom of
113 Scho¨n, supra n. 9, 815.
114 Case 270/83, Commission v. France (1986).
115 This is what Panayi has referred to as ‘reverse subsidiarity’, or ‘the situation whereby, in exercising their technically exclusive powers, Member States find themselves significantly
constrained by EU law’. Supra n. 97.
116 Inter alia, ECJ Case of 28 Jan. 1992, Case C-204/90, Bachmann [1992] ECR I-249, para. 22; ECJ, 12 Dec. 2002, Case C-385/00, De Groot [2002] ECR I-11819, para. 103.
117 That was the case, among others, in (in that regard) C-152/03, Ritter Coulais; C-182/06, Lakebrink; C-141/99, AMID; C-470/04, N; C-431/01; Mertens; C-293/06, Deutsche Shell;
C-446/03, Marks & Spencer; C-264/96, ICI; C-414/06, Lidl Belgium; C-200/98, X AB e Y AB; C-377/07; STEKO; C-418/07; Papillon; and C-337/08, X Holding BV.
Notes
An Ever Distant Union: The Cross-Border Loss Relief Conundrum in EU Law
491
establishment,118 the fact is that not all legal entities or
legal forms deserve the same treatment, which is only
reasonable, as not all of them grant the same rights and
obligations, or are for that matter comparable.
A salient example is the comparison between PEs and
subsidiaries. The reasoning of the Court partly varies
depending on the perspective, residence country or host
country, that is adopted.119 This is particularly obvious
after the X Holding BV case, where it is established that
while the host country must grant the same treatment to
PEs and (resident) subsidiaries, the Home State may estab-
lish a difference between PEs and subsidiaries. It should be
noted that this was exactly the view express by Advocate
General Geelhoed in his Opinion in the Test Claimants in
Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation (C-374/04); the bot-
tom line is that the comparison between a PE and a
subsidiary will be correct if it is done from the Source State
perspective.120
The ECJ now seems clearer in establishing that subsidi-
aries and PEs are not in the same situation,121 but for some
time now there has been a line of cases that have assimilated
PEs to subsidiaries at least for some purposes, thus counter-
ing well-established principles in International Tax Law122
as well as the rational of EU direct taxation and in particular
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive.123 The reasoning of the
Court is not, of course, always straightforward so that
instead of establishing a PE-subsidiary comparison or a
migrant/non-migrant comparison for the sake of the non-
discrimination principle, the Court may use the more flex-
ible (in practice) notion of restriction. Thus, for the purpose
of double taxation, it has been established that the general
international tax rule by which a PE cannot access the DTA
network, what normally would entail double taxation,124
may be restrictive. Such was the conclusion in Saint Gobain,
(paragraph 59).125
As we have seen, loss compensation for PEs depends
largely on the method employed in order to avoid double
taxation. The exemption method will not allow for com-
pensation, as it entails both losses and profits not being
included as taxable income (from the perspective of the
State of residency). The credit method, on the other
hand, will normally exclude foreign profits but allow
for compensation of losses under the worldwide tax
regime. To a certain extent, and in particular after the
Futura, AMID, and Deutsche Shell cases, the Court has
extended the possibilities of loss compensation for PEs in
comparison with the established practice in international
taxation. It is also now established that the head office or
owner of the PE must be allowed to offset its losses (vertical
upward set off), the risk of double dipping being easily
curbed via a recapture mechanism. Thus, in the Kranken-
heim Ruhesitz (C-157/07) case,126 the Court admits a recap-
ture of losses system for PEs established by the State of
residence, once the PE has made a profit, even when the
Host State does not allow for a loss carry-forward system
for PEs. In the case at hand, the DTA between Germany
and Austria provided that the benefits of the PE be exon-
erated in the country where the principal company has
its seat.
The latest ECJ case law seems to be examining the
comparison between PEs and subsidiary a bit more care-
fully. The CIBA (C-96/08) and X Holding BV are good
recent examples of this. The main element is that the
comparison between PE and subsidiary seems to differ
depending on the perspective that is adopted. Thus, from
a Home State perspective, the PE and the subsidiary do not
have to be treated equally. The same does not hold from a
Source State perspective: this last State must treat PEs as
residents. As Calderon has recently stated,127 the Court
seems inclined to establish a comparability criterion based
on the position of the Member State vis-a`-vis the PE or the
subsidiary. As this author has pointed out, it should also be
noted that the argument sometimes put forward by Member
States, in order to exclude extending fiscal consolidation
regimes outside their borders, which revolves around the
balanced allocation of taxing powers and the territoriality
principle, may be inconsistent with the way CFC regimes
are designed and applied, extending their consequences to
118 The Court has often stated that ‘to accept that the Member State of establishment may in all cases apply different treatment solely because the registered office of a company is
situated in another Member State would deprive Article 43 EC of its substance’ (see Case 270/83, Commission v. France, para. 18, and Marks & Spencer, para. 37).
119 Caldero´n Carrero, supra n. 63.
120 According to the Advocate General: ‘. . .it follows as a consequence of the method of dividing tax jurisdiction adopted by Member States – that is, the distinction between
worldwide (home state) and territorial (source state) tax jurisdiction – that the concept of discrimination applies in different ways to states acting in home state and source state
capacity. Quite simply, as the nature of the tax jurisdiction being exercised in each case differs fundamentally, an economic operator subject to home state jurisdiction cannot per se
be considered to be in a comparable situation to an economic operator subject to source state jurisdiction, and vice versa. As a result, Art. 43 EC imposes two different categories of
obligation on a state, depending upon the jurisdictional capacity in which it is acting in a particular case’, para. 57.
121 Panayi, supra n. 97, 37.
122 In this regard, see Royal Bank of Scotland (para. 31), CLT-UFA (C-253/03, para. 17). L. Hintsanen, ‘The Attribution of Income to Permanent Establishment under EC Law’,
European Taxation 4 (2003): 114; M. Tenore, ‘The Transfer of Assets from a Permanent Establishment to Its General Enterprise in the Light of the European Law’, Intertax 8/9
(2006): 390.
123 F.A. Garcı´a Prats, ‘Application of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive to Permanent Establishments?’, European Taxation 5 (1995): 179 et seq.
124 Garcı´a Prats, supra n. 80, 422 et seq.; J.M. Caldero´n Carrero, La doble imposicio´n internacional en los convenios de doble imposicio´n y en la UE (Pamplona: Aranzadi, 1997), 295 et seq.
125 See P. Pistone, ‘Tax Treaties and the Internal Market in the New European Scenario’, Intertax 35 (2007): 77 et seq.
126 Note that the case applies Art. 31 of the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement (which is equal to freedom of establishment in Art. 43 EC) as Austria did not enter the EU
until 1995, after the facts of the case took place.
127 Caldero´n Carrero, supra n. 63.
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other jurisdictions following an entity approach.128 By the
same token, it could be argued that a Member State that
establishes a non-resident tax system for PEs pursuing, to a
certain extent, a principle of general ‘force of attraction’129
and thus attributing the PE income that have not been
strictly generated in their territory will be inconsistent
when trying to limit loss compensation for those same PEs.
To sum up, the Court concludes that two of the loss relief
systems applicable to PEs and subsidiaries are compatible
with the freedom of establishment to the extent that certain
conditions are met.130 First, a loss recapture system estab-
lished by the Resident State of the PEs’ principal is valid,
even when the Host State of the PE does not allow PEs to
offset losses (Krankenheim). The disparity arising among the
two tax systems cannot be imputed to the Resident State.
The second one is a system where only final or terminal
losses of subsidiaries or PEs are admitted as a loss relief for
the parent/principal and by the State of residence.
4.3. Consolidation and Group
Relief Systems
The best known case of group relief systems for loss carry-
over is the much commented Marks & Spencer II case (C-446/
03), where the Court did not follow the strict case law of
Bosal Holding BV (C-168/01), that may have entailed admit-
ting all foreign losses.131 Marks & Spencer II has received
much criticism and commentary.132 It has been suggested
that the case has two perverse incentives: for Member States
to reduce compensation periods, and for groups to engage in
loss trafficking by way of wrapping up subsidiaries’ activ-
ities earlier than otherwise they would have done, so as to
benefit from the terminal losses doctrine.133
The Court admitted three types of justification, taking
jointly (conjunctive analysis): the safeguard of a balanced
allocation of tax powers, the danger of double dipping or
double use of the losses, and the danger of tax avoidance via
loss trafficking. However, it also found that the UK rules for
group relief were not proportional in those cases where the
subsidiary had exhausted its possibilities of setting off losses
in its State of residence, hence the now known as final or
terminal losses doctrine. More recent cases have taken into
account only one of the three, thus confirming that they
may be independent.134 The consequences of the case are
not finished, and in fact UK courts are struggling in trying
to determine the meaning and scope of the cryptic final losses
doctrine.135
As a matter of principle, the Court considers restrictions
to foreign subsidiaries’ losses to be contrary to the freedom
of establishment but justifiable in many cases. In the 2008
Papillon (C-418/07) case, the Court applied the ‘group relief’
(ICI case) and ‘group contributions’ doctrines (X AB e YAB,
C-200/98). In Papillon, the Court, while admitting that the
French regime, ‘in refusing to extend the benefit of the tax
integration regime to a resident parent company wishing to
include its resident sub-subsidiaries in that regime where it
holds those sub-subsidiaries through a non-resident subsidi-
ary, the provisions of the CGI at issue in the main proceed-
ings have the effect of ensuring the coherence of that regime’
(paragraph 51), ruled that the legislation went beyond than
what was necessary, in particular since Member States may
request all relevant tax information (from The Netherlands
in this case), under the Mutual Assistance Directive.136
Therefore, and since ‘practical difficulties cannot of them-
selves justify the infringement of a freedom guaranteed by
the Treaty’ (paragraph 54),137 the risk of tax avoidance (by
double dipping the losses) or to safeguard the allocation of
taxing powers is not accepted as a justification. The French
regime, by excluding the integration with the Parent of its
French subsidiary that is held by a holding resident in the
Netherlands, is then an unjustified infringement of the
freedom of establishment.
Especially after X Holding BV, the ECJ is fine tuning its
opinion bearing in mind that not all loss relief systems are
the same.138 This case dealt with the system that to a
greatest extent permits the total transfer of losses among
entities, that is, the tax consolidation regime. With regard
128 The new CFC rules announced by the United Kingdom follow precisely that approach.
129 Which is expressly rejected by the OECD MC Commentaries, Art. 7, para. 10.
130 See A. Martı´n Jime´nez & J.M. Caldero´n Carrero, ‘La jurisprudencia del TJUE: los efectos del principio de no discriminacio´n y las libertades ba´sicas comunitarias sobre la legislacio´n
nacional en materia de imposicio´n directa’, in Convenios Fiscales Internacionales y Fiscalidad de la UE (CISS, 2010).
131 D. Weber, ‘The Bosal Holding Case: Analysis and Critique’, EC Tax Review 4 (2003): 221 et seq.
132 This case was highly criticized, as proves the number of contributions solely dedicated to its analysis. See, among others, M. Gammie, ‘The Impact of the Marks & Spencer Case on
US-European Planning’ Intertax (2005): 485; F. Vanistendael, ‘The ECJ at the Crossroads: Balancing Tax Sovereignty against the Imperatives of the Single Market’, European
Taxation 10 (2010); M. Lang, ‘The Marks & Spencer Case: The Open Issues Following the ECJ’s Final Word’, European Taxation 54 (2006); E. Sanz Gadea, ‘La compensacio´n de
pe´rdidas de las filiales extranjeras: Marks & Spencer’, Estudios Financieros. Revista de contabilidad y tributacio´n 276 (2006): 95 et seq.; J.M. Caldero´n Carrero, ‘Consolidacio´n Fiscal e
Importacio´n de Pe´rdidas: el caso Marks & Spencer’, Noticias de la UE 257 (2006): 112 et seq.
133 Wattel & Terra, supra n. 67, 654.
134 Notably, in Lidl (C-414/06), the Court admits the risk of tax avoidance (via double dipping) as well as the need to preserve the allocation of the power to impose taxes and declares
the German treatment of PEs to be compatible with the freedom of establishment.
135 See Panayi, supra n. 97, 38 and 43–48.
136 Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 Dec. 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation.
137 Cases C-334/02, Commission v. France [2004], para. 29; C-386/04, Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer [2006], para. 48; and C-446/04, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation
[2006], para. 70 are quoted in that regard.
138 See, in this regard, Caldero´n Carrero, supra n. 63.
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to it, the Court has admitted that a limitation of its scope is
consistent with EU freedoms.
X Holding BV dealt directly with the Netherlands tax
consolidation regime, the question being whether:
Articles 43 EC and 48 EC preclude legislation of a
Member State which makes it possible for a parent com-
pany to form a single tax entity with its resident sub-
sidiary but which prevents the formation of such a single
tax entity with a non-resident subsidiary, in that the
profits of that non-resident subsidiary are not subject to
the fiscal legislation of that Member State.
In other words, should the Netherlands treat a foreign
subsidiary as a resident one for the purposes of its tax
consolidation regime?
The analysis of the Court can be summarized as follows:
(i) The Netherlands tax consolidation regime constitutes
an advantage in that it is beneficial for tax purposes.
(ii) Not extending such a regime to a foreign EU based
entity renders less attractive the exercise of the free-
dom of establishment (‘the exclusion of such an advantage
for a parent company which owns a subsidiary established in
another Member State is liable to render less attractive the
exercise by that parent company of its freedom of establish-
ment by deterring it from setting up subsidiaries in other
Member States’, para. 19).
(iii) Such a difference in treatment will only be aligned
with the EU Treaties if one of two elements is present:
either the two situations are not objectively compar-
able or they may be justified by an overriding reason
in the general interest.
(i) The first element is NOT present: the two situa-
tions are objectively comparable.139
(ii) The second element is present, therefore:
(iv) There is an overriding reason present, which is the
preservation of the allocation of the power to impose
taxes; furthermore:
(v) The measure is proportionate as permanent establish-
ments situated in another Member State and non-
resident subsidiaries are not in a comparable situation
with regard to the allocation of the power of
taxation.140
Although the preservation of the allocation of taxing
powers seems to be the only overriding reason in the Court’s
ruling, another second reason also looms in the text, which
is the fear of abuse.141 This is, in our view, the ultimate
reason behind this ruling and an element that brings EU
case law closer to established tax law principles. As the
Court states, allowing a border-wise unlimited tax consoli-
dation regime may make a lot easier the double dipping of
losses.
This argument is present in paragraphs 31 and 32 of the
above cited case:
Since the parent company is at liberty to decide to form a
tax entity with its subsidiary and, with equal liberty, to
dissolve such an entity from one year to the next, the
possibility of including a non-resident subsidiary in the
single tax entity would be tantamount to granting the
parent company the freedom to choose the tax scheme
applicable to the losses of that subsidiary and the place
where those losses are taken into account (. . .) since the
dimensions of the tax entity can therefore be altered,
acceptance of the possibility of including a non-resident
subsidiary in such an entity would have the consequence
of allowing the parent company to choose freely the
Member State in which the losses of that subsidiary are
to be taken into account.
So, even when it is true that X Holding BV differs from
other similar recent cases, such as SGI, OyAA, Lidl Belgium,
or Marks & Spencer, in that the overriding interest consisting
of the safeguard of the allocation of taxing rights stands
alone, the other element usually present – tax avoidance – is
not completely absent in the reasoning. In addition, as
Calderon has pointed out, the Court may not be entirely
consistent with its previous case law, as the argument by
which a tax consolidation regime may not be extended
abroad because foreign subsidiaries are subject to a different
tax regime may be in contradiction with the rulings in
C-377/07, STEKO industriemontage GmbH.142 Finally, again,
by using the balanced allocation of powers argument, the
Court makes it clear that PEs and subsidiaries are in differ-
ent positions, as a PE is really not comparable in terms of
allocation of powers, for it is always only one taxpayer – the
principal – with a taxable presence in another territory. This
is (still) perfectly consistent with Articles 7.1 and 23.2 of
the OECD MTC.
139 As Calderon, supra n. 63, has noted, the Court probably does not really think the situations to be alike, as its reasoning does not elaborate on exactly why they should be alike,
which seems at least strange, not only in light of the arguments of the other parties but also taking into account International Tax Law, which otherwise the Court seems to follow.
The murky as well as over simplistic para. 24 is appalling: ‘the situation of a resident parent company wishing to form a single tax entity with a resident subsidiary and the
situation of a resident parent company wishing to form a single tax entity with a non-resident subsidiary are objectively comparable with regard to the objective of a tax scheme
such as that at issue in the main proceedings in so far as each seeks to benefit from the advantages of that scheme, which, in particular, allows the profits and losses of the companies
constituting the single tax entity to be consolidated at the level of the parent company and the transactions carried out within the group to remain neutral for tax purposes’.
140 The Court here refers to International Tax Law, adding that this conclusion can be derived from the DTA, and in particular Arts 7.1 and 23.2.
141 Caldero´n Carrero, supra n. 63.
142 Ibid. See also A. Garcı´a Prats, ‘Is It Possible to Set a Coherent System of Rules on Direct Taxation under EC Law Requirements?’, in A Vision of Taxes within and outside European, ed.
Luc Hinnekens & Phillippe Hinnekens (Borders: Kluwer Law International, 2008), 435 y ss; D. Weber, ‘In Search of a (New) Equilibrium Between tax sovereignty and the
Freedom of Movement within the EC’, Intertax, 34 (2006): 587 et seq.
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It is probably too soon to undertake a full assessment of
the effects of these rulings on cross-border loss relief regimes
in the EU. So far, some Member States, such as Sweden,
have recently introduced changes in their group relief tax
systems to align them with ECJ case law,143 which may,
however, still be problematic.144 Others, such as the United
Kingdom and Germany, have been advised by the Commis-
sion to do the same. In the case of the United Kingdom, the
Commission contends that it has ill adapted its legislation
to the M&S case.145 As for Germany, its Organshaft legisla-
tion may entail a hidden discrimination of EU subsidiaries.146
The rulings of the Court are often highly controversial, and
it has often been stressed that they undermine the tax sover-
eignty of Member States.147 In the most recent cases, how-
ever, the Court seems to pay particular attention to different
regimes and is growingly cautious with its rulings. The fact
that cross-border loss relief is effectively intertwined with the
(non) harmonization of the taxable base is probably factored
in the cases, especially after Marks & Spencer II.
5. IS EVERYONE LOSING IN THE END?
WHAT IS DESIRABLE AND WHAT IS
POSSIBLE FOR CROSS-BORDER LOSS
RELIEF COORDINATION IN THE EU
The most obvious conclusion of this article is that, under the
current system of cross-border loss relief (or rather its
absence), everyone losses.
Taxpayers – companies and individuals – lose as they are
deprived of the possibility of offsetting losses and, in the
end, of being taxed in accordance to their ability to pay,
which in practice leaves staggering percentages of losses
stranded.148 This is crucial for small and medium enter-
prises, whose relevant weight in the EU economy has been
so often pointed out. In their case, the current situation may
well undermine all possibilities of expansion, especially if
they are located in a small Member State.149 Furthermore,
even when loss relief is granted, the higher compliance cost
or the different requisites would normally imply a greater
administrative cost, which is in the end a type of tax
pressure, albeit indirect.
Member States also lose, as there is growing uncertainty as
to what type of system of loss compensation is actually EU
proof. Notably, the system may end up punishing its best
players, that is, Member States with existing loss relief
mechanisms and a developed tax system will be in a harder
position than countries, such as Slovenia, that simply have
decided to do away with the system. In this regard, the
consequences of the Court rulings may even run counter to
the Treaty aim of ensuring neutrality, partly as a conse-
quence of Member States’ reactions to the rulings.150 There
are many examples of this, apart from loss relief. Thus, in
the case of thin capitalization rules, after the ECJ rulings
Member States mostly changed the rules to make them
applicable also in domestic situations, something that runs
counter to the basic logic of thin capitalization rules.151
After the Marks & Spencer ruling, the reaction of Member
States was less clear, but at least five Member States decided
to increase the scope of their group exemption regimes to
EU activities, while another (Slovenia) decided to repeal the
regime altogether.152
This brings us to the third loser of the non-system of
cross-border loss relief, which is the ECJ, as it may not be
fulfilling its objective to foster neutrality and thus missing
out in its role as umpire of tax law. Loss relief clearly
exemplifies the limits of integration via ECJ case law. In
general, tax harmonization via case law is at best compli-
cated and most of the time biased and uncoordinated. One
must bear in mind that not all cases make it to the Court,
143 The purpose of the Swedish new rules is to make the group contribution regime compliant with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in that the deduction for
final losses of subsidiaries within the EEA, if certain requirements are met, will be allowed. The rules will enter into force on 1 Jul. 2010 and will apply to final losses of foreign
subsidiaries liquidated after 30 Jun. 2010. See a full description in D. Edvinsson, ‘New Rules Seek to Make Group Contribution Regime EU Law Compliant’, European Taxation
50, no. 7 (2010).
144 As Edvinsson points out (see footnote above), the strict rules requiring direct ownership of the subsidiaries, among others, make the new laws hardly compatible with the ECJ
case law.
145 IP/09/1461, 8 Oct. 2009. According to the Commission (reference number 2007/4026), ‘the UK continues to impose conditions on cross-border group loss relief which in
practice make it impossible or virtually impossible for the taxpayer to benefit from such relief in accordance with the judgment in Marks & Spencer. This in particular concerns the
following aspects: an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of the condition that there should be no possibility of use of the loss in the State of the subsidiary (paragraph 7 of
Schedule 18A of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act (ICTA) 1988); the parent company should demonstrate that the condition that there should be no possibility of use of the
loss in the State of the subsidiary is met as from immediately after the end of the accounting period in which the loss arises (Part 1, paragraph 7(4), of Schedule 18A ICTA 1988);
the legislation states that it applies only to losses incurred after 1 April 2006 (Part 3 of Schedule 1 of the Finance Act 2006)’.
146 For Germany, Procedure No. 2008/4409, 29 Jan. 2009. See, in this regard, Caldero´n Carrero, supra n. 63.
147 Garcı´a Prats, supra n. 142, 435 y ss; Weber, supra n. 42, 585.
148 See, in this regard, the data presented by the ‘Survey of Losses on Cross-Border Activities within the EU by the Federations of Swedish Industries’, available in S. Lodin &
M. Gammie, Home State Taxation (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2001).
149 There is widespread agreement that losses are hardest on small and medium companies; see J. Freedman, ‘Reforming the Business Tax System: Does Size Matter? Fundamental
Issues in Small Business Taxation’, in Australian Business Tax Reform in Retrospect and Prospect, ed. C. Evans & R. Krever (Thomson Reuters, 2009), 176 et seq.
150 R. De La Feria & C. Fuest, ‘The Economic Effects of European Tax Jurisprudence’, WP (2010, forthcoming) – quoted with permission of the authors.
151 Ibid.; the paper’s table show that as many as thirteen Member States actually did just that. Spain was not one of them; instead, it was decided to make thin capitalization rules not
applicable for domestic or EU-wide operations; for a critic of the reforms, see V. Ruiz Almendral, ‘Subcapitalizacio´n y libertad de establecimiento: el caso ‘‘Test Claimants in the Thin
Cap Group Litigation’’ como una oportunidad para rehabilitar el artı´culo 20 del TRLIS’, Noticias de la Unio´n Europea 283 (2008): 121–134.
152 De La Feria & Fuest, 24 (Austria, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, the United Kingdom).
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partly because not all countries/courts submit questions to
the Court.153
Finally, the EU as a whole also loses, as there is less
coordination, less market integration, and therefore less
international competition.
It is then obvious that restrictions to loss relief have an
effect that go far beyond discriminating or restricting, that
is, beyond making it less attractive to move around. Such
restrictions touch the core of taxation of income. If no loss
relief is provided, the tax is not reflecting the real ability to
pay, thus not only is it not being neutral and inefficient, it is
also creating a fictional tax debt.
That being said, the options, from a realistic point of view,
are not so clear. Most likely, the only long-term solution to
curb the disadvantage that having so many different and
often incompatible loss relief schemes is the adoption of some
type of unitary taxation scheme, such as the CCCTB.
Of course this does not look feasible, at least in the short
term,154 especially in light of the current crisis, when losing
tax revenues is particularly problematic for deficit-laden EU
countries. To the moment, there are several works dedicated
to assessing the economic consequences that the adoption of
the different systems may bring about for Member States.155
A recent paper suggests that a loss consolidation system
such as that proposed in the CCCTB project may cause
significant revenue falls of the corporate tax, in particular
because of the new loss consolidation possibilities,156 which
hardly makes the project more attractive. It has also been
suggested that an EU-wide cross-border loss offsetting will
upset tax revenues for some Member States,157 something
that could be avoided using a formulary apportionment
system, as it would establish a basic insurance against revenue
loss, which, according to some, may then enable Member
States to set up competitive (lower) tax rates in order to
attract foreign investors.158 According to another paper,159
establishing an optional CCCTB with a formulary apportion-
ment system would have uneven consequences in Member
States, as well as causing an overall reduction of tax revenues.
A salient element of these analyses, as yet another paper
points out,160 is that estimating losers and winners in terms
of tax revenue is difficult as so many different elements must
be taken into account, such as the type of economy or
industrial composition of the country, the final definition
of the tax base and the tax rates, even if these are not
originally an element of the CCCTB.
Barring, at least ‘cross-border-loss-wise’ ideal scenario of a
CCCTB, the Commission’s 2006 proposal stands out as not-
too-bad second-best option. Ideally, a system of temporary
loss transfer, with an afterwards recapture, could be set up in
the form of a Directive on losses, thus unearthing the
discarded original proposal. The rulings of the Court may
pave the way to the final adoption of such a system, espe-
cially bearing in mind that they may imply harder condi-
tions for offsetting of losses, with regard to EU initiatives,
such as the Draft Directive.161
In this regard, it is probably true that the current situa-
tion of loss carry-over tax chaos is somewhat parallel to the
situation tackled by Schumacker and the like, on the pro-
blems with migrating workers and the corresponding free-
dom. The ultimate argument for forcing EU States to
establish a non-resident EU worker optional tax regime
was that even though it was the State of residence, the
territory with primary taxing rights and the one in the best
position to take into account personal and family circum-
stances in order to assess the individual’s final tax liability
when the State of residence was not in a position to do that,
because the individual derived more than 75% (or 90%, in
Gilly) of her income in the Source State, then this same State
had to take on the role of the State of residence and tax
according to family circumstances, among others. The pre-
sent situation would be similar in that the losing subsidi-
ary’s Home State should be the one primarily granting loss
deduction, but maybe the Home State of the parent should
take on that role when the subsidiary cannot, as only this
last State would be in a position to take into account such a
loss, when the subsidiary’s Residence State cannot.162
153 J.H.R. Weiler, ‘A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors’, Political Studies 26 (1994): 510. J. Baquero Cruz, Entre competencia y libre circulacio´n.
El derecho constitucional econo´mico de la Comunidad Europea (Madrid: Civitas, 2002), 108.
154 Unless it is adopted via enhanced coordination, as suggested by L. Cerioni, ‘Postponement of the Commission’s Proposal for a CCCTB Directive: Possible Ways Forward’, Bulletin
for International Taxation (2010).
155 See generally J. Mintz & J.M. Weiner, ‘Some Open Negotiation Issues Involving a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in the European Union’, Tax Law Review 62 (2008–
2009): 111.
156 L. Bettendorf et al., ‘Corporate Tax Consolidation and Enhanced Cooperation in the European Union’, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation WP 10/01 (2009): 19–20,
<www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/centres/tax/papers/Pages/PaperWP1001.aspx>.
157 M. Gerard & J. Weiner, ‘Cross-Border Loss Offset and Formulary Apportionment: How Do They Affect Multijurisdictional Firm Investment Spending and Interjurisdictional Tax
Competition?, CESifo Working Paper No. 1004’, <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractid¼434080>, 2003.
158 Mintz & Weiner, 112 et seq.
159 M.P. Devereux & S. Loretz, ‘The Effects of EU Formula Apportionment on Corporate Tax Revenues’, Fisc. Stud. 29, no. 1 (2008): 2,<www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/centres/tax/Documents/
working_papers/WP0706.pdf>.
160 A. Van Der Horst, L. Bettendorf & H. Rojas-Romagosa, ‘Will Corporate Tax Consolidation Improve Efficiency in the EU?, Tinbergen Inst. Discussion Paper No. 2007-076/2’,
<www.tinbergen.nl/discussionpapers/07076.pdf>, 2007.
161 As it is pointed out in Panayi, supra n. 97, 43.
162 This has been suggested in T.P. Rodrigues, ‘Cross-Border Loss Relief Jurisprudence’, EC Tax Journal 10, no. 1 (2008). This would be the ‘always somewhere’ approach by the ECJ,
as put in A. Rivolta, ‘Transfer of Residence within the European Union: The Treatment of Pre-existing Losses – Part 2’, European Taxation (February–March, 2010): 67 et seq.
Critical with this (Rodrigues’) approach is Scho¨n, supra n. 9, 828.
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The problem with the ‘do-nothing approach’ that EU
Law subsidiarity principle in tax matters produces is that
far too often, when faced with an EU compatibility
problem of their tax systems, Member States do one of
three things, all of them damaging to the internal coher-
ence of tax systems and, in the end, to neutrality in the
EU. First, they may increase the scope of the rule. Thus,
when the problem is an anti-abuse rule that is stricter for
transnational situations, the rule may be changed so that
it is also applied in domestic situations. This is what
happened, to name just one example, with thin capitali-
zation rules and was a perfect blunder, for these types of
rules are designed for an international arena and it sim-
ply does not make sense to have them for domestic
operations.163
Second, when the problematic provision is some type of
tax advantage or benefit that was only available for domestic
operations or agents, the solution may be either to extend it
to other EU members and (third) to simply eliminate it
altogether, which will be less challenging for tax revenues.
In all cases, the result may be equally dissatisfying, for at
least part of the agents loses the benefit, with nobody
winning it. The conclusion is always the same: in the long
run, it does not make sense to respond to the ECJ or the
Commission by parching up the tax systems. A more funda-
mental reform is needed, and recent cases just make it more
pressing. Loss relief is a good example of this. The question
remains whether it is possible to coordinate the loss relief
systems while waiting for the more ambitious objective, in
this case the CCCTB, to be attained. Just extending domes-
tic regimes to transnational situations will not work, as the
tax bases are different.
Finally, there are a number of underlying unresolved
issues that will necessarily shape the debate on the cross-
border set off of losses. The main one is that the
problem of cross-border losses is at the heart of the
territoriality problem in the EU. Strict (tax) territoriality
in loss compensation is clearly disadvantageous in many
scenarios, in comparison with a purely domestic situa-
tion, even when that disadvantage is not contrary to EU
Law as it now stands. A profit-making PE will not be
allowed by the Source State to offset the losses incurred
by its Home State-based principal, something that is
not contrary to the freedom of establishment. So, as
much as the ECJ has ruled that there has to be some
type of loss compensation, the fact is that Member States
do retain tax powers to define the taxable event in their
territories and it is extremely hard to figure out a system
that would account for all losses. However, as the situation
now stands, there is clearly room for improvement, in order
to avoid that losses, in particular from subsidiaries, become
stranded for long.
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Annex: Summary of the Most Relevant ECJ Cases on Tax Losses
Case (Alphabetical Order) Ruling
C-141/99, AMID Cross-border loss offset for PE (Home State perspective). The Belgian system proves dis-
advantageous for those companies with a PE in another Member State, in an inequality of
treatment in relation to companies without establishments outside Belgium. There is no
objective justification to treat a Belgian PE located in Luxemburg any different than if that
PE (branch) had been located in Belgium.
C-293/06, Deutsche Shell PE Currency losses must be taken into account.
C-250/95, Futura Cross-border loss offset for PE (Host State perspective). The Source or Host State may limit
the offsetting of losses to those that have an economic link to its territory (territoriality
principle) but may not make it harder to prove losses than it is to prove benefits (profit split
for the second, separate allocation for the first)
C-182/08, Glaxo Wellcome Group relief via portfolio depreciation write-off. There is a restriction of free movement of
capitals, which may be justified by the allocation of tax powers and the need to curb tax
avoidance
C-264/96, ICI UK Group relief system (consortium relief). Consortium relief is available only to companies
controlling, wholly or mainly, subsidiaries whose seats are in the national territory. This is
inconsistent with the freedom of establishment as it discriminates against UK companies
holding EU entities versus UK companies holding UK companies.
C-157/07, Krankenheim
Ruhesitz
Permanent establishments.
C-414/06, Lidl Belgium German clawback loss relief system for PEs.
C-446/03, Marks & Spencer UK Group relief system. Temporal losses may not be offset, final losses must (domestic
legislation needed to be reformed).
C-431/01, Mertens Discrimination and free movement of workers. Individual taxpayer, similar facts to Amid.
C-231/05, O y AA With regard to Finish/Swedish Group contributions, it is not contrary to EU Law to deny a
deduction for group contributions from a Swedish company to its foreign parent company or
its foreign sister company, even if under similar circumstances a deduction would have been
granted in a purely domestic situation. Swedish rules are not contrary to the freedom of
establishment where the deduction is claimed on the basis that the subsidiary’s losses may not
be utilized due to the expiry of a loss carry-forward period in the subsidiary’s country of
residence.
C-418/07, Papillon French Group tax integration system is a restriction to the freedom of establishment because
it excluded French resident subsidiaries indirectly held via a Dutch parent. The measure was
justified to preserve coherence of tax system but was disproportional.
C-527/06, Renneberg Individual taxpayer cannot deduct his negative income from a personal dwelling in his Home
State, where his income is taxed in the Source State.
C-347/04, Rewe-Zentralfinanz Group relief via portfolio depreciation write-off.
C-377/07, STEKO industrie-
montage GMBH
Group relief via portfolio depreciation write-off.
C-200/98, X AB and Y AB Finish/Swedish Group contributions.
C-337/08, X Holding BV The Netherlands Group tax consolidation system. The Netherlands regime may exclude non-
resident entities from its tax consolidation system in order to safeguard the allocation of tax
powers. In addition, PE and subsidiaries are not comparable for tax reasons.
C-96/08, CIBA PE costs offsetting. (Hungarian) Tax law imposing a vocational training levy (VTL) is
incompatible with the freedom of establishment in situations when a Hungarian undertaking
with a branch in the Czech Republic cannot benefit from some advantages, which may reduce
the levy paid in connection with employees of that branch.
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